



Summary of BRAC Research
**ROHINGYA CRISIS IN BANGLADESH
PEACE, SECURITY AND OTHER ISSUES**

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PEACE, SECURITY AND OTHER ISSUES**

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Acknowledgement

Building on seven seminal research pieces, this book is the product of steadfast hard work and intellectualism by many individuals who have shed light on key issues regarding the Rohingya crisis. This book represents a joint endeavor to chronicle, interpret, and propose solutions to one of our time's most critical humanitarian crises. We are very much indebted to the eminent author of the research papers, Prof Dr. Selim Raihan, Dr. Saima Khan, Hossain Mohammed Omar Khayum, Dr. M Sanjeeb Hossain, Nafisa Tabassum, Al Muktadir Elahi Esmam, Mohd. Rubayat Ahsan, Tariqul Islam, Abu Said Md. Juel Miah, Dr. Helal Mohiuddin, Dr. Mahjabeen Haque, Dr. Mohammad Salim Chowdhury, Roufun Naher, Dr. Khurshed Alam, Ahmed Jubayer and Sharmin Akthar, their vast experience and commitment have enriched this work.

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unwavering commitment to addressing the multidimensional challenges posed by the Rohingya crisis. None of this work would have been possible without the tireless efforts of our field researchers, data analysts, and program teams, who often worked in very trying conditions. Their dedication and commitment are testaments to BRAC's mission to build a just, equitable, and inclusive world.

Finally, we would like to express our profound appreciation to the international community of stakeholders like governments, international organizations, development partners, and local actors—who have continued to support the Rohingya response. We hope this publication deepens our understanding of the crisis and proves a useful resource for policymakers, practitioners, and advocates working toward sustainable solutions and lasting peace.

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MESSAGE FROM THE **EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR**

Seven years have passed since the Rohingya crisis violently shook the world, with almost a million people fleeing across the border from Myanmar to Bangladesh in a matter of weeks. Since then, the Government of Bangladesh, UN agencies, BRAC, and a host of other humanitarian actors have consistently collaborated to support the evolving needs of the community and the needs of the host community, which has experienced significant upheaval.

Now, firmly in the protracted phase, a strategic shift in our approach is imperative. To aid that shift, I am honoured to present this publication, which brings together seven comprehensive studies on the response. From socio-economic impacts on host communities to identifying the specific challenges adolescent girls face in the camps, these evaluations present actionable insights for policymakers and practitioners.

As an example of one of those insights, there is a prominent narrative in Bangladesh that the Rohingya are more prone

to violence, and that violence in general is more accepted within their community. This narrative has both policy and programming implications, as well as affecting the everyday lives of the Rohingya. One of the studies in this publication presents empirical evidence to counter this narrative, showing there are no significant differences between the rate of exposure to violence and adverse experiences between the Rohingya and host communities. On the contrary, one of the studies found that the host community reported higher incidences of sexual harassment and assault compared to the Rohingya community.

Insights like these help to shift the conversation back to the real issues, such as the prevalence of gender-based violence in many communities living in situations of poverty and inequality, and the focus back on solutions.

I hope that this publication will

help inform policy and programming and ensure that it reflects the real needs on the ground more and more broadly, against a backdrop of an increasingly unstable future globally, I hope that it will also support humanitarian and development actors in re-imagining approaches to protracted crises by investing in humanitarian–development nexus strategies.

ASIF SALEH

Executive Director
BRAC





MESSAGE FROM THE **SENIOR DIRECTOR**

The Rohingya crisis highlights the immense complexities of forced displacement and its far-reaching impact on individuals and communities. For over seven years, Bangladesh has carried the significant responsibility of hosting nearly a million Rohingya FDMNs, demonstrating exceptional generosity and resilience. However, the prolonged nature of this crisis reminds us of the need to transition from reactive measures to proactive, sustainable solutions.

This publication aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the crisis. It delves into themes such as peacebuilding, adolescent protection, socio-economic challenges, and behavioural dynamics. Each chapter offers meaningful insights into the experiences of Rohingya FDMNs and host communities, underscoring the urgency of inclusive, equitable, and secure interventions.

In my regular work on the ground with the Rohingya, I have been humbled by the resilience of the people we serve and inspired by the

power of community-driven approaches. BRAC's efforts in Cox's Bazar, while far from perfect, reflect a sincere commitment to supporting the most vulnerable by improving access to education, healthcare, and economic opportunities. Still, as this publication reveals, the road ahead remains challenging.


The research identifies critical priorities, including addressing gender-based vulnerabilities, strengthening adolescent resilience, and alleviating socio-economic pressures on host communities. It also emphasises greater collaboration among national governments, international organisations, and local stakeholders to create comprehensive and practical solutions. Lessons from BRAC's interventions, shared in this publication, offer insights to inform future strategies.

I sincerely thank the researchers, authors, and editorial team for their dedication to this effort. I hope the insights and recommendations within these pages inspire policymakers, practitioners, and advocates to join us in striving for sustainable solutions that uphold dignity, equity, and peace for both Rohingya FDMNs and the host communities.

KAM MORSHED

Senior Director
BRAC







**Rohingya FDMNs
in different clusters with
BRAC interventions in 2024**

BENEFICIARY REACH IN COX'S BAZAR ROHINGYA CAMP


Humanitarian Crisis Management Programme (HCMP), BRAC




BENEFICIARY REACH IN COX'S BAZAR HOST COMMUNITY



BENEFICIARY REACH IN BHASAN CHAR







Economic Modeling for a Five-Year Midterm

Livelihood Framework
for Rohingya FDMNs in Bangladesh

Dr. Selim Raihan

Professor, Department of Economics, Dhaka University and Executive Director, SANEM

Background

Over a million Rohingya people, officially recognised in Bangladesh as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs), have taken refuge in the country, fleeing the atrocities in Myanmar in consecutive waves of forceful displacement since the early 1990s. In late August 2017, the Myanmar military led a disproportionate and indiscriminate crackdown – a clearance operation against the Rohingya ethnic population in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. These crimes against humanity prompted an unprecedented exodus of more than 742,000 Rohingya population to Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. The massive fresh influx has compounded the existing challenges and caused a major humanitarian crisis. The emergency needs of persecuted Rohingyas have been met with passionate support from the host community first, followed by a coordinated response from the Government of Bangladesh, national and international NGOs and UN agencies. After six years, the situation of

Rohingyas has taken a stable position from the humanitarian perspective; however, the Rohingyas remain aid-dependent with limited livelihood opportunity to become self-reliant. Rohingyas are not officially allowed to move or work outside the camps.

The Government of Bangladesh has been striving to expedite the discussion of repatriation of the Rohingyas sheltered in the camps in Cox’s Bazar and Bhasan Char. However, the progress of the discussion is not bright as no significant response is perceptible from the Myanmar side. Moreover, the international pressure on the Myanmar Government is not significantly visible, which could positively push the discussion. Until peaceful repatriation is possible, the displaced Rohingyas will need various humanitarian support and services including livelihood support to help them become less burden to the Government of Bangladesh. Since the

solution to the crisis has been taking time, it is high time to discuss other possible options, including making a blend with a livelihood approach for tackling the humanitarian crisis. For that reason, the first and foremost option is making a strategic shift to the livelihood approach from the humanitarian crisis management aspect. The idea of blending the humanitarian approach with other approaches such as development-oriented solutions is not new. The UN and the World Bank have set a new way of working by blending the humanitarian approach with development actions. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has prioritised the blending. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members are also taking actions in line with the prioritisation. It also strongly relates to the Grand Bargain and the UN Development System Reform (UNDS Reform). All UN agencies, many donors and NGOs are supportive of the approach.

THE FUNDING FLOW FOR THE ROHINGYA CRISIS RESPONSE IS DIMINISHING. THE FUND FOR ROHINGYA CRISIS RESPONSE RANGED FROM 72% TO 75% IN THE FIRST THREE YEARS, WHICH CAME DOWN TO 65% IN 2020. IN 2022, THE AVAILABLE FUNDS DECLINED AND DROPPED TO ABOUT 39% OF WHAT WAS DEMANDED. IN 2023, THE HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES APPEALED FOR MORE THAN \$876M TO SUPPORT THE ROHINGYAS, HOWEVER, THE JOINT RESPONSE PLAN FOR SUPPORTING THEM WAS ONLY 42% FUNDED.

Since the prospect of repatriation is diminutive and funding flow is declining, there is a need to flag out the discussion on finding potential ways to make a strategic shift in the Rohingya crisis response. In this regard, the objective of the exercise is to develop a five-year-long mid-term livelihood framework

for the Rohingya crisis response and necessary cost estimation through economic modelling. The framework will be shared with international communities to get their vetting and mobilise funding for the implementation of the framework.



Objective

To develop a five-year midterm livelihood framework for Rohingya crisis management and estimate the necessary cost, through economic modelling, to implement the livelihood framework, given that the responding agencies will be placed to promote a livelihood approach and the Rohingyas will be involved in livelihood activities.

The exercise is expected to provide an estimate of how much money the Rohingyas will be able to contribute to their daily spending through their livelihood activities and how much money the Government of Bangladesh and the donor agencies will need to provide backup support for helping the Rohingyas survive above the poverty level.



Requirement of Financial Resources Over the Next Five Years for the Rohingya FDMNs


To project the number of Rohingya FDMN (Forcibly Displaced Myanmar National) population between 2024 and 2028, we start with the current population figures and incorporate an annual growth rate of 3%. We consider two scenarios: no repatriation and some repatriation, as outlined in Table 1. According to these projections, the population of Rohingya FDMN would rise to 1,115,704 by 2028 under the no-repatriation scenario. Conversely, under the scenario where there is some repatriation (an annual 50,000 from 2024 to 2028), the population would decrease to 850,247 by 2028.

These projections are essential for planning and allocating resources effectively to ensure the well-being of the Rohingya FDMN population. The different scenarios help us understand the potential impact of repatriation on population dynamics and resource needs.

Table 1: Assumptions About Repatriation

ASSUMPTION	DESCRIPTION
No repatriation	There will not be any repatriation of Rohingya FDMNs in the next five years.
Repatriation	Some repatriation (annual 50,000 from 2024 to 2028).

Figure 1: Projection of Rohingya FDMN population



SOURCE: AUTHOR'S PROJECTION USING FIGURES FROM THE OFFICIAL SOURCES

Calculation of the Cost of Basic Needs

To estimate the financial requirements for supporting the Rohingya FDMNs in Bangladesh, we calculate the cost of basic needs using the rural poverty line income for Chattogram from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) 2022. This cost is adjusted for inflation and includes essential expenditures on education, healthcare, and Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) services. The calculated estimates for the cost of food, clothing, and shelter under different repatriation scenarios are presented in the below.

Scenario 1 No Repatriation

If repatriation does not take place, the total cost of fulfilling basic needs for the Rohingya FDMN population is projected to rise steadily from \$427.92 million in 2024 to \$481.63 million in 2028. This increase is primarily due to inflationary pressures, population growth, and rising costs of essential services. The upward trend highlights the long-term financial burden on Bangladesh and international donors in maintaining the refugee population without a durable solution.

Scenario 2 Gradual Repatriation

Under the repatriation scenario, the cost burden shows a declining trend, decreasing from \$406.33 million in 2024 to \$367.03 million in 2028. This scenario assumes a structured return of Rohingya FDMNs to Myanmar, leading to a gradual reduction in resource requirements. The decline in cost reflects the easing of fiscal pressure on Bangladesh and a lower dependency on humanitarian aid. However, successful repatriation depends on favourable conditions in Myanmar, including security, citizenship rights, and livelihood opportunities for returnees.

Calculation of the Cost of Education

Education is a critical component of humanitarian assistance for the Rohingya FDMNs in Bangladesh. Ensuring access to primary and secondary education is essential for the well-being of Rohingya children, equipping them with fundamental skills and preventing the emergence of a lost generation. To estimate the financial requirements for providing education, we have calculated the number of primary and secondary school-going children based on demographic data. The unit cost of education is derived from government expenditure per student at both the primary and secondary levels, expressed as a percentage of GDP per capita. The cost projections for education under two scenarios—no repatriation and gradual repatriation.

Scenario 1 No Repatriation

Under the assumption that no repatriation takes place, the cost of education is projected to increase steadily from \$125.58 million in 2024 to \$171.80 million in 2028. This rise reflects the growing number of school-age children in the Rohingya community and the escalating costs of educational services due to inflation and higher resource demands. Without repatriation, the burden of funding Rohingya education will continue to grow, necessitating sustained financial commitments from the government of Bangladesh and international donors.

Scenario 2 Gradual Repatriation

In the repatriation scenario, where a portion of the Rohingya population returns to Myanmar each year, the cost of education still rises but at a slower rate, increasing from \$120.38 million in 2024 to \$132.17 million in 2028. This relatively moderate growth indicates a reduction in the number of students requiring education services in Bangladesh. However, successful repatriation depends on Myanmar's ability to provide quality education and safe learning environments for returnees, which remains uncertain given the current political and security situation, rights, and livelihood opportunities for returnees.



Calculation of the Cost of Healthcare

Access to healthcare is a fundamental component of humanitarian assistance for the Rohingya FDMNs in Bangladesh. Given their vulnerable living conditions in refugee camps, healthcare services are crucial in preventing disease outbreaks, managing malnutrition, and addressing maternal and child health needs. To estimate the financial requirements for providing healthcare services to the Rohingya population, we have used data on current health expenditure per capita (in US dollars), adjusted for inflation, and applied it to the total Rohingya population.

Scenario 1 No Repatriation

If repatriation does not take place, the total healthcare cost is projected to increase from \$52.73 million in 2024 to \$72.14 million in 2028. This steady rise is driven by two primary factors. Inflationary pressures raise per capita healthcare costs each year, from \$53.19 in 2024 to \$64.66 in 2028. Population growth leads to an increasing number of people requiring medical services. Under this scenario, Bangladesh will face growing financial pressure to sustain healthcare services for the Rohingya population. Without additional external funding, this burden could strain resources allocated to the healthcare system in host communities.

Scenario 2 Gradual Repatriation

Under a structured repatriation scenario, the total cost of healthcare still rises over time but at a significantly slower rate, increasing from \$50.07 million in 2024 to \$54.97 million in 2028. The decline in healthcare cost growth reflects a decreasing refugee population requiring medical assistance in Bangladesh. However, for this scenario to be feasible, Myanmar must ensure access to healthcare facilities and services for returning Rohingya, which remains uncertain due to ongoing political instability and concerns about healthcare infrastructure in Rakhine State.

Calculation of the Cost of WASH

Access to safe water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services is a fundamental requirement for maintaining public health and preventing the spread of diseases, particularly in densely populated refugee camps. The WASH infrastructure for the Rohingya FDMNs in Bangladesh requires ongoing investment in clean water supply, sanitation facilities, and hygiene promotion.

Scenario 1 No Repatriation

In the no-repatriation scenario, the cost of WASH services is expected to increase from \$8.33 million in 2024 to \$11.39 million in 2028. The primary factors driving this upward trend include inflationary pressures, which increase the per capita WASH cost from \$8.40 in 2024 to \$10.21 in 2028. Also, population growth raises the total number of individuals requiring access to clean water and sanitation facilities. The steady increase in costs highlights the long-term financial burden of sustaining WASH services in the camps, requiring continuous support from the Bangladesh government and international donors.

Scenario 2 Gradual Repatriation

Under the repatriation scenario, where a portion of the Rohingya population returns to Myanmar annually, the total cost of WASH services still rises over time but at a slower rate, increasing from \$7.91 million in 2024 to \$8.68 million in 2028. This lower cost trajectory reflects a declining refugee population in Bangladesh, which reduces the demand for WASH infrastructure and maintenance. However, repatriation is contingent on Myanmar's ability to provide adequate water and sanitation facilities in Rakhine State, which remains uncertain given the ongoing political instability.

Total Resources Requirement

The overall financial requirements for sustaining essential services for the Rohingya FDMNs in Bangladesh are substantial. These costs stem from providing basic needs (food, clothing, shelter), education, healthcare, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services. The resource estimations for the period 2024-2028, under two scenarios: no repatriation and gradual repatriation.

Scenario 1 No Repatriation

Under the assumption that no repatriation occurs, the financial burden steadily increases, requiring a total of \$3,707.08 million (or \$3.71 billion) over five years. The annual cost grows from \$676.01 million in 2024 to \$810.65 million in 2028, reflecting rising expenditures due to inflation and an increasing population in need of assistance.

Scenario 2 Gradual Repatriation

If repatriation proceeds at a steady pace, the financial requirements remain significant but gradually decline. The total cost over five years in this scenario amounts to \$3,158.25 million (or \$3.16 billion), approximately 15% lower than the no-repatriation scenario. Annual expenditures decrease from \$643.16 million in 2024 to \$619.15 million in 2028, as fewer people require services in Bangladesh.

The results suggest that a sustained financial commitment is essential: Even in the best-case scenario (gradual repatriation), Bangladesh and international donors will need to mobilize over \$3.16 billion over the next five years to ensure the well-being of the Rohingya population. Without a clear, long-term funding strategy, service disruptions could severely impact refugee welfare.

The total cost difference between the two scenarios is \$548.83 million, highlighting the additional financial strain Bangladesh faces if repatriation does not occur. This increasing burden underscores the need for international burden-sharing through donor commitments and global humanitarian funding.

Who Shares the Cost-Burden Under Different Scenarios?

Under the Business-as-Usual (BAU) scenario for financing resources for Rohingya FDMNs, the refugee situation remains largely unchanged, with continued donor dependency, limited repatriation, and a lack of sustainable long-term solutions.

1. Minimal Repatriation

Challenge

Political instability in Myanmar prevents large-scale, voluntary repatriation. The majority of Rohingya FDMNs remain in Bangladesh indefinitely, increasing the financial burden on the government and donors.

Impact

Long-term costs for food, shelter, healthcare, and education persist, placing significant pressure on international aid and Bangladesh's resources.

2. Limited Informal Job Opportunities

Economic Participation

Most Rohingya FDMNs (Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals) work in the informal economy (agriculture, construction, small trade) due to movement restrictions and lack of legal work permits.

Impact

Despite skill-building programs, Rohingya FDMNs remain economically dependent on humanitarian aid, unable to achieve self-sufficiency. Exploitative working conditions and low wages further hinder progress.

3. Continued Donor Dependency and Infrastructure Support

Dependency

Rohingya refugees remain heavily reliant on donor funding for basic needs. However, donor fatigue is growing, creating uncertainty about future support.

Government Role

Bangladesh bears increasing costs for infrastructure development around the refugee camps, such as roads and sanitation, without financial support from donors.

Impact

The Bangladesh government faces rising fiscal pressure as it balances infrastructure costs with other national priorities, while donor support becomes increasingly uncertain.

4. Social Cohesion and Tensions

Local Impact

Tensions between Rohingya FDMNs and host communities over resources and opportunities could escalate into conflicts, especially in Cox's Bazar and Teknaf.

Government Involvement

Bangladesh must invest in social cohesion programs to prevent tensions from leading to larger security challenges.

Impact

Social unrest would increase the financial burden, requiring additional resources for conflict resolution, security, and emergency interventions.

Under this scenario, Many Rohingya engage in low-paying, informal work, such as day labour in agriculture, construction, fishing, and small-scale trade, but they lack legal recognition in the labour market. NGOs and UN agencies provide stipends to Rohingya volunteers, helping them sustain their livelihoods, but the long-term impact of these stipends on economic self-sufficiency remains unclear. While official policies restricting Rohingya movement remain unchanged, in practice, many Rohingya FDMNs are informally working beyond the camps due to loosened enforcement of mobility restrictions. The lack of formal job opportunities forces many Rohingya to accept exploitative working conditions, with little to no legal protection, making them vulnerable to abuse and extortion.

Rising Security Costs and the Cost of Exclusion

1. Rising Security Costs

With limited legal opportunities for Rohingya FDMNs, many resort to risky coping mechanisms like petty crime, human trafficking, and drug smuggling, escalating the security costs around the camps.

Bangladesh faces growing expenditures on policing, border security, and surveillance as criminal networks exploit the vulnerable refugee population, threatening local stability.

2. The Cost of Exclusion

Exclusion from formal economic life increases the risk of exploitation, child labor, and forced marriage. It perpetuates poverty, fueling greater humanitarian needs and creating long-term costs for both Bangladesh and donors.

Exclusionary policies may increase social unrest, crime, and potential radicalization, posing a security challenge for Bangladesh and its neighbors.



Business-as-Usual (BAU) Scenario

Financial, Social, and Security Challenges

Under the BAU scenario, minimal repatriation, ongoing donor dependency, and limited economic integration lead to unsustainable financial and social conditions:

1. Declining External Support and Increased Government Burden

Donor fatigue may result in reduced funding for essential services like food, healthcare, and education, pushing Bangladesh to fill the gaps with its own resources, leading to malnutrition, disease, and social unrest.

2. Economic Desperation and Expansion of the Shadow Economy

Rohingya FDMNs, denied legal employment, turn to informal and illicit economic activities, fueling the expansion of the shadow economy and increasing social tensions with host communities.

3. Escalation of Crime and Violence within Refugee Camps

As aid decreases, competition for resources may spark internal conflicts. Criminal syndicates and extremist groups may gain influence, leading to violence, radicalization, and lawlessness.

4. Refugee Spillover and Regional Instability

Deteriorating conditions may force Rohingya FDMNs to migrate within Bangladesh or to neighboring countries, leading to increased regional instability and geopolitical tensions, especially with countries like Myanmar, Thailand, and Malaysia.

Pessimist Scenario

Worst-Case Trajectory

In this scenario, the decline in external support leads to a full-blown crisis:

1. Food and Health Insecurity

A sharp decline in external funding results in mass food insecurity, poor health conditions, and potential epidemics, escalating the refugee crisis.

2. Crime and Violence

Worsening economic conditions lead to rising criminal activity, particularly human trafficking and illicit trade, further destabilizing both refugee camps and host communities.

3. Radicalization and Security Threats

Desperation and lack of opportunity could drive radicalization, turning vulnerable Rohingya FDMNs into targets for extremist groups, amplifying regional security threats.

4. Regional Instability

Increased migration and the spread of criminal activities could exacerbate regional tensions, especially in neighboring countries, risking violent pushbacks and diplomatic strain.

Optimist Scenario

Pathways to Sustainable Refugee Livelihoods

In this scenario, Rohingya FDMNs are empowered to access dignified livelihoods, leading to self-reliance and social cohesion:

1. Economic Empowerment

Rohingya FDMNs gain access to structured livelihoods, transitioning from aid dependency to self-reliance through employment in agriculture, handicrafts, and other sectors. This boosts local economies and fosters social cohesion.

2. Market Expansion and Host Community Benefits

Investments in local infrastructure and joint economic ventures benefit both Rohingya FDMNs and host communities, stimulating growth, reducing tensions, and creating shared prosperity.

3. Collaborative Service Provision

The private sector, NGOs, and the government collaborate to deliver essential services like healthcare, education, and WASH facilities, benefiting both Rohingya FDMNs and host communities and reducing strain on Bangladesh's resources.

4. Continued Donor Engagement

Ongoing donor support helps bridge income gaps while ensuring Rohingya FDMNs can meet their needs and integrate into the local economy, easing financial burdens on both Bangladesh and international donors.

In Exploration of Strategies

Generating Jobs through Economic Modeling

To build sustainable livelihoods for Rohingya FDMNs (Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals), a comprehensive economic modeling framework has been developed to estimate the investment required to create 200,000 direct jobs for both host communities and FDMNs population of around one million in greater Chattogram. The model uses Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) techniques to assess how investment flows through the economy and translates into employment.

- The estimated total investment required is USD 3.3 billion over five years—averaging USD 660 million per year.
- Targeted sectors include food processing, apparel, plastics, construction, pharmaceuticals, and IT, with food processing alone projected to generate over 39,000 jobs.
- This would result in a 0.51% annual increase in national GDP and generate 1 million additional indirect jobs, enhancing broader economic growth and inclusion for both Rohingya and host communities.
- While SEZs (Special Economic Zones) have already attracted USD 3.9 billion in committed investment, realizing this potential depends on improving investment readiness and operationalizing these zones quickly.





Investing in Skills Development

The Government-UN Framework on Skills Development (endorsed in August 2022) supports the creation of livelihood pathways for both FDMN and host communities. With USD 36.6 million in funding needs and 44 implementing partners, the program aims to serve nearly 88,000 individuals, including 57,000 Rohingya FDMNs (Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals) and 31,000 host community members. Key goals include:

- Building transferable skills aligned with the Myanmar Curriculum to support future repatriation.
- Improving self-reliance and reducing dependency on aid through vocational training and entrepreneurship support.
- Preparing both populations for durable economic participation—whether in Bangladesh or upon safe return to Myanmar.

Integration and Social Cohesion

Job creation alone is insufficient without a parallel focus on social cohesion and integration. Cox's Bazar is a geographically and economically constrained area. A large-scale economic intervention—such as creating 100,000+ jobs—could drive up transportation and food prices, intensify local tensions, and exacerbate inequality if not carefully managed.

Aligning livelihood efforts with existing government programs is essential. Refugee participation must be structured in ways that avoid fueling resentment while fostering shared benefits for host communities. Ensuring balanced development, equitable access to services, and strong communication between stakeholders will be vital for long-term success.

Key Pillars of the Framework

1. Whole of Society Approach

Coordinated, inclusive engagement across government, development agencies, and local communities is essential. This involves aligning policies to enhance social cohesion, minimize economic competition, and promote joint benefits.

2. Economic Empowerment

Structured access to employment through work permits, job matching systems, and vocational certification allows Rohingya FDMNs to save for reintegration in Myanmar while contributing to the local economy. Geographic dispersion and access to formal employment help ease local labor market pressures and prevent exploitation.

3. Institutional Coordination

A government-led coordination platform is needed to design, implement, and monitor livelihood programs, track socioeconomic outcomes, and align development financing—particularly through multilateral partners such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).

Leveraging International Experience

Global refugee host countries have pioneered models that Bangladesh can learn from:

- Jordan implemented the Jordan Compact, securing over USD 12 billion in funding and trade concessions in exchange for integrating Syrian refugees into its labor force through SEZs and work permit reforms.
- Uganda empowered refugee entrepreneurs by connecting them to regional supply chains, enhancing both self-reliance and host economy benefits.
- Turkey saw over 10,000 Syrian businesses open between 2011–2017, generating employment and USD 334 million in investment. However, these models also highlight key challenges: limited flexibility in work permits, distance of SEZs from refugee communities, and high barriers to formal entrepreneurship. These pitfalls must be avoided in the Rohingya context.

Bangladesh Can Adapt These Lessons by

- Simplifying work permit systems.
- Linking refugee enterprises to national and regional markets.
- Supporting entrepreneurship through cash grants, training, and legal pathways.
- Testing small-scale livelihood pilots and scaling what works.



Policy Recommendations

Skills Development and Economic Inclusion

Align skills training with future labor market needs in Myanmar to support repatriation.

Develop vocational and entrepreneurship programs for both Rohingya FDMNs (Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals) and host communities.

Support women and vulnerable groups through childcare stipends, transport subsidies, and inclusive training models.

Enabling Policy Environment

Introduce flexible work permits that allow multiple job opportunities.

Issue legal ID/work permits to formalize employment and improve oversight.

Create legal pathways for business registration to encourage refugee-led enterprises.

Institutional Coordination and Financing

Leverage development finance to reform infrastructure and labor systems.

Operationalize Special Economic Zones with refugee participation.

Foster private sector partnerships to create demand-driven employment and joint economic zones that serve both Rohingya FDMNs and locals.

Conclusion


A Strategic Turn Toward Resilience

Bangladesh stands at a turning point. With more than a million displaced people likely to remain for the foreseeable future, the country must reframe the Rohingya crisis as a development challenge—not just a humanitarian emergency. International experience shows that with the right frameworks, refugees can be empowered to contribute meaningfully to host economies.

Through structured access to work, skills development, entrepreneurship, and coordinated investments, Rohingya FDMNs can gradually transition from dependency to self-sufficiency. Simultaneously, host communities can benefit from expanded infrastructure, inclusive economic growth, and reduced tension over shared resources.

This transformation requires strong political will, donor coordination, and international solidarity. If implemented thoughtfully, Bangladesh's midterm livelihood strategy can become a model for managing protracted displacement—balancing dignity, development, and diplomacy.





Cox's Bazar Peace Index 2023

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A recent survey conducted in Ukhiya and Teknaf has unveiled a notable increase in discontent and stress among both the Rohingya and host communities. This surge in tension is attributed to a confluence of factors including the Covid-19 pandemic, escalating food prices, and a dearth of employment opportunities. These findings echo observations made by the World Food Programme in 2022. As of 31 January 2023, there are a total of 954,707 Rohingya refugees residing in Cox's Bazar district of Bangladesh, a staggering influx precipitated by a large-scale security operation by the Myanmar army in 2017. This sudden surge of Rohingyas has placed an immense strain on the already limited resources of the region.

Additionally, reports from various researchers indicate a significant uptick in drug trade and crimes in the area in recent years. Moreover, the region is prone to frequent natural disasters such as

monsoon rains, cyclonic storms, landslides, and flash floods. With the anticipated escalation in the frequency of these disasters due to global climate change, the vulnerability of this region is set to exacerbate further. All these factors contribute to the escalating tension and stress experienced by both communities in Cox's Bazar.

The mass displacement of people significantly affects the overall peace situation of the host nation, influenced by various factors, including the context of the refugee situation, the host country's response, and the existing social, economic, and political conditions. Hosting FDMNs can have both positive and negative effects on a host nation's peace. The 'Cox's Bazar Peace Index 2023,' the first of its kind for Bangladesh, has been developed with the aim of understanding and addressing these complex issues better.

The Peace Index, derived from surveys conducted in 8 host areas and 10 Rohingya camps in Ukhiya and Teknaf, is instrumental in gauging the level of peace or simmering discontent among different communities and areas. This index focuses on four main themes: Access to Services, Economic Opportunities, Social Dynamics and Security, utilising a range of indicators and questions to comprehensively assess peace dynamics. The study, employing a quantitative approach with a representative sample of 1268 individuals, aims to offer insights into the state of peace in response to the Rohingya crisis.

The comprehensive analysis of various indicators sheds light on the disparities in accessing essential services, socio-economic conditions and social dynamics between the host and Rohingya communities.

NOTABLY, THE INDEX HIGHLIGHTS THE DISPARITIES IN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE, WITH THE ROHINGYA COMMUNITY FACING MORE SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES IN BOTH ASPECTS. HOWEVER, THE ROHINGYA COMMUNITY GENERALLY EXPRESSES GREATER SATISFACTION WITH FOOD INTAKE, POSSIBLY DUE TO HUMANITARIAN AID RECEIVED AND LOWERED EXPECTATIONS STEMMING FROM THEIR HISTORY OF ENDURING STATE DISCRIMINATION IN MYANMAR.

To enhance economic well-being, it is imperative to improve access to livelihood opportunities, reduce dependency on informal financial mechanisms like speed money and enhance communication channels. The economic health of households reveals disparities between the two communities, with the Rohingya community reporting higher financial stability likely

due to aid assistance against income uncertainties compared to the local population.

Social dynamics reveal negative perceptions and reservations from the host community regarding socialising and intermarrying with the Rohingya community. Despite expressing trust in local authorities and

community leaders to resolve disputes, the Rohingya community appears somewhat less satisfied with conflict resolution with the host community. Gender-specific differences in safety perceptions underscore the importance of addressing



distinct experiences of men and women within both communities, especially concerning domestic and sexual abuse and drug-related crimes.

The Cox's Bazar Peace Index for 2023 categorises scores into three levels: Low Score (0-3.5), Medium Score (3.5-7), and High Score (7-10). The overall composite score for Cox's Bazar stands at 6.61, indicating a medium level of peace. While 'Access to Basic Services' and 'Social Dynamics' received high scores, 'Economic Opportunities' and 'Security' obtained medium scores, signalling areas for targeted interventions.

The study also highlights variations in peace scores concerning gender, literacy levels, professions, and geographical locations. Notably, Ukhiya scored higher in peace compared to Teknaf, with differences observed within specific areas and communities. Access to schooling, healthcare, food, and livelihood opportunities remains crucial for both communities, necessitating tailored interventions to address their unique needs.

Access to Education

Both the host and Rohingya communities largely agree on the accessibility and quality of schooling in their areas. Approximately 86% of respondents from both groups find it easy for local children to attend schools or learning centres, while 88% of the host community and 84% of the Rohingya community approve of the education quality. Regarding private tutoring and access to textbooks/learning materials, opinions slightly diverge. A higher percentage of Rohingya respondents (84%) find it easy to avail private tutors compared to the host community (71%). However, around 70% of individuals from both communities find it easy to obtain textbooks or learning materials. Notably, private tutoring serves as a significant source of education for the Rohingya community, whereas it plays a supportive role in formal education for the host community.

Access to Healthcare

Both communities generally find it easy to access basic healthcare services, with 8 out of 10 members reporting ease in consulting local doctors. However, a larger proportion of the host community (77%) finds it easy to obtain basic medication compared to the Rohingya community (approximately 58%). For vaccinations, over 90% of both communities can easily access them. Notably, a slightly lower percentage of the host community (88%) reports easy access to COVID-19 vaccinations compared to the Rohingya community (96%), likely due to dedicated vaccine distribution centres within Rohingya camps.

Access to Food and Nutrition

Approximately 91% of respondents from both communities reported having three meals a day. However, opinions vary regarding whether the food consumed meets nutritional needs daily, with 53% of the host community and 68% of the Rohingya community expressing satisfaction.

Both communities largely consume eggs and vegetables three times a week, with about 71% reporting so. However, the consumption of meat or fish items is lower, around 43%. Specifically, 45% of the host community and 41% of the Rohingya community consume meat or fish items at least three times a week.

Ease of **Livelihoods and Finding Work**

Access to income-generating opportunities is crucial for both communities well-being. Approximately 46% of both host and Rohingya households find it easy to access funds. However, challenges arise in starting businesses or meeting work-related requirements, with roughly half of the host community members and 41% of Rohingya individuals facing difficulties.

Concerning business or work activities, 60% of individuals from both communities mention having to pay “speed money” to expedite tasks, with higher rates observed in Teknaf. Additionally, around 70% of individuals from both community’s face challenges in seeking employment.

Household **Economic Health**

There is a split among the host community regarding whether their family’s financial needs are always met, while 60% of Rohingya households affirm meeting their needs. Savings are more prevalent among Rohingya households (50%) compared to the host community (25%), and fewer Rohingya households report borrowing money (12%).

Social Relations and Opinions

Both communities report close relations with neighbours, with around 90% stating frequent visits and comfort in borrowing items. Rohingya respondents tend to view host community members more positively, while opinions from host community members towards Rohingya are less favourable.

Dispute Resolution

Both communities generally find it easy to resolve disagreements among household members, with higher satisfaction rates among Rohingya regarding community leaders' resolution of disputes.

Security and Domestic Issues

Both communities express concerns about safety, especially at night. Rohingya respondents feel safer regarding children playing unsupervised. However, a higher percentage of Rohingya respondents report threats of abandonment and physical harm from family members compared to the host community.



Sexual Abuse and Crime

The host community reports a higher incidence of sexual harassment and assault compared to the Rohingya community. Both communities have concerns about unpunished sexual offenders and coercion into the sex trade, with a higher agreement among the host community.

Petty to Violent Crimes

The host community reports higher occurrences of minor crimes compared to the Rohingya community. Both communities note high occurrences of threats and physical altercations, with a significant gender disparity, especially among women.

Substance Abuse

The host community perceives higher rates of drug dealing, drug use, and associated violence compared to the Rohingya community.

Disaster Concerns

Both communities express vulnerability to natural disasters, with similar percentages reporting concerns about storms, landslides, floods, and fires. Rohingya females express higher concern regarding the threat to their lives and livelihoods from natural disasters.

The Cox's Bazar Peace Index 2023 has provided invaluable insights into the state of peace and well-being in the region. The perception of the Rohingya community is profoundly shaped by their harrowing experiences in Myanmar, influencing how they perceive their current situation. This unique perspective often leads them to view their circumstances more positively. In contrast, the Bangladeshi host population tends to compare their present conditions to those before the arrival of the Rohingya FDMNs, often resulting in a more pessimistic outlook, particularly regarding the strain on their limited resources.

The Peace Index represents a significant milestone in illuminating the current state of peace and overall social welfare in the Cox's Bazar area. Understanding the nuanced dynamics of peace across different dimensions and demographics is vital for crafting effective policies and initiatives. The report

underscores the importance of context-specific strategies to address varying community challenges. Advocating for deeper and more nuanced data analysis, this report stands as a valuable tool for policymakers, enabling them to make informed decisions, promote social cohesion, and foster an environment conducive to sustainable peace.

The issue of access to services, economic opportunities, social dynamics, and security within the Cox's Bazar camps is complex and urgent. Ensuring adequate access to essential services such as healthcare, education, and sanitation is paramount for safeguarding the well-being of the Rohingya community. Moreover, creating economic opportunities through skill development and training can empower individuals and bolster self-sufficiency. Addressing social dynamics entails promoting inclusion, gender equality, and community engagement, while

prioritising the safety and security of the Rohingya population. This necessitates a comprehensive approach involving collaboration between the government, international organisations, and the Rohingya community itself.

Sustainable solutions that prioritise the well-being of the Rohingyas are essential for creating a more stable and secure environment within the camps. Ongoing support and collaboration are necessary to address these interconnected challenges holistically.



A photograph of a child's hand holding a fishing net. In the background, various items of clothing are hanging, suggesting a laundry area or a market stall. The overall tone is somber and documentary.

A Snapshot into Bangladeshi Professionals'

Perceptions of Rohingya FDMNs

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Despite prolonged uncertainties surrounding the peaceful repatriation with dignity of Rohingya, classified as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs), perceptions among professionals from across Bangladesh suggest a consensus that repatriation should occur only in a safe and dignified manner, with most opposing forced repatriation to Myanmar. Their protracted presence in Cox's Bazar, a relatively less developed part of the country, has fuelled anti-Rohingya sentiment due to impacts on jobs, natural resources, environment, and social cohesion, as revealed by a recent survey among various professionals conducted by BRAC. Decreasing international assistance over the years has further strained local resources, causing tensions between the host community and the Rohingya FDMNs (Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals).

As of 2025, the Rohingya situation in Bangladesh has become a long term issue. Despite Bangladesh's plans to graduate from 'least developed country' status in 2026, it still hosts over a million Rohingya FDMNs in its impoverished southeastern region. The lack of funding from the international community has strained the system meant to help the FDMNs, leading to tensions between the host and the Rohingya communities.

This study aimed to understand the perceptions of Bangladeshi professionals toward Rohingya people living in Rohingya camps by conducting interviews with a diverse group of professionals from different parts of Bangladesh and various economic backgrounds. The interviews provided invaluable insights into how professionals' perceptions varied based on their proximity to the Rohingya camps and their socioeconomic status.

Following a number of mass displacements in the late 1970s and early 1990s, a significant number of Rohingyas remained scattered across villages in Cox's Bazar, one of Bangladesh's "lagging districts" facing socio-economic insecurities. Though the primary concentration of the Rohingya population remained confined within official camps and makeshift settlements, those who managed to spread to other villages in the region have somehow become naturalised or in the process of integration. While the Rohingya people primarily lived in official camps or unofficial makeshift settlements, the latter became more permanent over time, gradually encompassing Bangladeshi villages in the region.

Despite historical interactions along the Bangladesh-Myanmar borderlands, competition for limited resources led to tensions between the host and Rohingya communities, giving rise to the perception that the Rohingyas are the root cause of trouble and disorder in communities in southeastern Bangladesh, leading to negative perceptions not only among locals but also at the state level.

Several researches conducted between 2017 and 2023 documented a gradual decline in the relationship between the two communities, particularly those living in the southeastern part of Bangladesh, where Rohingya camps are located. These studies and reports from various organisations indicated sympathies fading and tensions rising among the host community, compounded by anxieties about being outnumbered by the Rohingya population, environmental degradation, and a lack of

support and information about the Rohingya response. Additionally, signs of waning solidarity and growing bitterness are more prominent among the impoverished residents of Ukhiya and Teknaf against the Rohingya community.

An opinion survey conducted by BRAC in 2018 found that over half of the respondents, primarily on humanitarian grounds, supported the Bangladesh government's decision to provide shelter to the Rohingya people. However, residents of Cox's Bazar, who predominantly opposed the decision, were motivated by economic concerns, fears of rising crime rates, conflicts between hosts and Rohingyas, and the potential spread of communicable diseases. About two-thirds of the respondents believed that the repatriation of Rohingyas to

Myanmar was "completely uncertain," feeling that repatriation would only occur if the Bangladesh government prioritised resolving the situation politically and enhancing diplomatic ties.

Another survey in the same year by exchange, involving 1,708 Bangladeshis from Teknaf and Ukhiya, provided valuable insights. While locals did not view the Rohingya people as their "friends," most of them believed that the latter integrated well into the local community. However, integration was not considered "beneficial" for the local community's future. Concerns about the impact of Rohingya people engaging in cheap labour, potentially driving down local wages, and leading to conflict and competition between the two communities were highlighted.

Some respondents suggested that increased community interactions through employment could improve relationships. A few respondents called for the repatriation of ‘old’ and ‘new’ Rohingyas. Additionally, around two-thirds of respondents identified drug use and/or trafficking as significant “safety concerns” due to the perceived increase in such activities since the recent mass displacement of the Rohingya people.

In September 2019, BBC Media Action, in collaboration with Dan Church Aid and another international agency, conducted “explorative research” to gain a clearer understanding of the underlying concerns and worries of the hosts in Cox’s

Bazar. Many locals shared fears related to a deep-rooted mythical prophecy and expressed concerns about being outnumbered by the Rohingya, while also reporting overall negative perceptions about the Rohingya people. Furthermore, a peer-reviewed study from 2019 assessing the perceptions of the host community reported a high proportion of negative beliefs and attitudes, with over 50% believing the Rohingyas had become displaced people due to their own faults.



Some professionals, despite being aware of the presence of Rohingyas in the country, reported having no particular opinion on the Rohingya population. Others expressed frustration due to the direct impact of the Rohingya people on their lives. Shifts in perceptions, particularly in the Chattogram division, were notable, with individuals expressing concerns about job opportunities, safety, and changes in the behaviour of Rohingyas.

Four out of five respondents were from the Rangpur division. A gardener from Bogura, while trimming overgrown shrubs, expressed with dismay in her voice: “We don’t really think about the Rohingya [...]. We have our Prime Minister who thinks about them.” She went on to say in a rather bitter tone: “We go home and do what we need to do. We come back to work. We are preoccupied with the problems we face at home.” After a captivating boat voyage along the river

Brahmaputra, we arrived at a small char (island) in Gaibandha, far from the Rohingya camps in south-eastern Bangladesh. The thoughts of a young female entrepreneur, displaced by climate change and managing a small business, aligned almost seamlessly with the gardener from Bogura. She mentioned that all she knew was that there was a lot of “gondogol” (trouble) in Myanmar, which is why the Rohingya people came to Bangladesh.

It became clear that as, by then, Bangladesh entered the sixth year of what had become a protracted sheltering of Rohingyas, the perceptions of a significant number of respondents had changed regarding the initial decision to provide shelter to the Rohingya people.

A private service holder from Dhaka echoed the sentiments of many of the testimonies that researchers received by saying that while I acknowledge that allowing the Rohingya to enter Bangladesh was a humanitarian gesture, I can only support this decision for a limited period.

THE LONG-TERM PRESENCE OF THE ROHINGYA IS NOT A SUSTAINABLE OPTION, GIVEN THE CURRENT CONDITIONS OF BANGLADESH'S ECONOMY AND SOCIETY. HE ALSO SAID THAT FOR AN OVERPOPULATED COUNTRY LIKE OURS, I NOW BELIEVE THAT IT WAS NOT THE MOST PRUDENT DECISION TO ALLOW SUCH A LARGE POPULATION TO ENTER AND STAY WITHIN BANGLADESH'S BORDERS.

Professionals living in proximity to Rohingya camps in Chattogram division, had a more noticeable shift in perceptions compared to other parts of the country. Respondents in their interviews expressed frustrations, saying their lives had been directly impacted by the presence of the Rohingya people in that region. For instance, an unemployed local student of Cox's Bazar, who once felt it was right to give shelter to the Rohingyas on religious grounds, now believed that decision was incorrect. She complained that members of the host communities were not getting jobs while the Rohingyas were continuing to accept jobs at lower wages in the local informal economy despite receiving aid from the World Food Programme (WFP). According to a representative of the Bangladesh government based in Cox's Bazar, there was a clear shift away from the once-positive relations that prevailed between the host and Rohingya communities.

A government college teacher in Brahmanbaria, the outskirts of the Chattogram division, said: "We embraced the Rohingyas, but now they are causing us harm." According to a lawyer based in Cox's Bazar, it was not just that there was a change in the perceptions of Bangladeshis, apparently, the mentality and attitudes of Rohingyas, too, had changed. "The Rohingya people are now showing signs of aggression and even harassing Bangladeshis visiting Rohingya camps," he said. A headmaster in Cox's Bazar claimed he was terrified of the prolonged presence of the Rohingya people.

Researchers, however, met a few professionals whose negative perceptions of the Rohingya people changed when they had the opportunity to interact with them. One of them, a recent graduate from Dhaka, who took up a paid opportunity to teach Rohingya FDMNs in Ukhiya, told: "I am not sure that I was empathetic towards the Rohingyas back in

the day. But I've done some research, and I got a chance to interact with them. I've seen how they actually live. My perceptions have changed quite a bit. I no longer stereotype the Rohingya people. They are human beings just like me, with flesh and blood. I don't see any fundamental differences between us." Overall, it is evident that negative perception of the Rohingya people had developed over time.

A fisherman in a blue shirt is seen from behind, holding a large, circular fishing net over a body of water. The net is made of a fine mesh and is partially submerged. In the background, there is a line of trees and some structures along the shore. The sky is a vibrant blue with scattered white clouds. The overall scene suggests a traditional fishing activity in a rural or coastal area.

Perceptions of Economic Impacts

The study found widespread concerns about the economic effects of hosting a large number of Rohingya FDMNs in an economically underdeveloped country like Bangladesh. It discovered two distinct yet related perspectives on economic impacts. On the one hand, several respondents from Chattogram and other divisions raised concerns about Rohingya people accessing the informal labour market in Bangladesh's southeastern region and beyond as day labourers, on the other local poor decry lack of aid like the parcels/ rations FDMNs received.

They said Rohingyas entering the job market led to locals losing employment opportunities. A government official dealing with the crisis shared: "The Rohingyas are getting involved in salt cultivation and deep-sea fishing. Many Rohingyas drive Tom-Tom (battery-run three-wheelers) between Cox's Bazar and Teknaf." Respondents repeatedly shared the perception that marginalised Bangladeshi day labourers below the poverty line were not getting work opportunities because Rohingya labourers offered the same services to the affluent locals of Cox's Bazar at lower wages. A government representative in Cox's Bazar explained that Rohingyas could work for lower wages because they had minimal expenses relating to food, rent, and electricity. He added that Rohingyas regularly sold extra relief items outside camps.

An unemployed student from Cox's Bazar claimed that although the Rohingyas are getting everything for free, they leave camps to do informal work for low wages. Bangladeshi labourers, on the other hand, were unable to work for lower wages because their lives were not subsidised by humanitarian agencies. In light of rising prices of essential goods and services, respondents repeatedly raised issues of inflation inflicted sufferings.

A representative of a UN agency had more optimistic perceptions. This person believed that the prolonged presence of Rohingyas had created new jobs for Bangladeshis and contributed to economic growth and infrastructure development. According to a government official dealing with the crisis, organisations such as JICA, the World Bank, and Asian Development Bank (ADB) had collaborated with the Bangladesh government to implement various projects within the host communities. This included, for instance, new roads and schools built with funds allocated in response to the Rohingya influx.

Furthermore, NGOs and INGOs had launched numerous poverty alleviation programmes. He felt that many of these achievements went unnoticed and deserved to be highlighted. Other professionals perceived that while the mass displacement of the Rohingya people created a need for educated locals who were now employed for favourable salaries, these opportunities benefited few.




Perceptions of Security Impacts

Many respondents perceived the prolonged presence of Rohingya FDMNs in Bangladesh as a national and regional security issue. There were concerns that the Rohingyas, who demographically outnumber the locals by a large margin in Ukhiya, were involved in criminal activities, such as murder, drug smuggling, human trafficking, theft, robbery, kidnapping, forgery, etc. A teacher from Cox's Bazar reminisced how Ukhiya was once a peaceful area. "Everything changed after the Rohingyas arrived. He spoke about a number of incidents of kidnappings, rapes, and gunfire, allegedly purported by some Rohingya criminals. I'm not sure how safe it is for us to live here", he added. A small business owner in Cox's Bazar said: "The people of Teknaf and Ukhiya are afraid to come out of their homes because of the Rohingyas."

Some other residents also expressed concerns about Rohingya FDMNs creating fake documents like passports, National ID cards (NID), and birth certificates as a means to fly to a third country. They feared that while law enforcement agencies were trying to manage the situation, they were in desperate need of more resources. A mason from Cox's Bazar shared: "The administration is unable to properly control crime. We need more administrative people here. Without them, the crime rates will increase." Another local, employed as a nurse, believed that no increase in law enforcement personnel would solve the problem. "Rohingyara toh nirapotta bahinike kono towakkai kore nah", she said (The Rohingya community reportedly does not always respect law and enforcement agencies.)

Some respondents feared that the Rohingyas may get involved in terrorist outfits. According to a Dhaka-based INGO worker, the chances of Rohingya FDMNs taking part in terrorist attacks could not be discounted given the Bangladesh Army had apprehended some of them with weapons in the past. However, another Dhaka-based academic offered a different perspective.

According to the academic, the Rohingyas did not pose a major security threat because the Bangladesh government had taken steps to combat terrorism within and beyond the Rohingya camps.



Perceptions of Environmental Impacts

Following the arrival of over a million people, and making shelters for them had some unavoidable environmental consequences. Residents in the Chattogram division, Cox's Bazar in particular, highlighted some devastating impacts on the environment in and around the Rohingya camps and how they were affected. A representative of the government working in Cox's Bazar claimed that 3000 out of a total of 4000 hectares of agricultural land had been destroyed because of new infrastructures built on them including building offices of NGOs and INGOs. Approximately 500 to 600 hectares of land next to the Rohingya camps have also turned into waste dumps for the camps.

Some respondents talked about the substantial toll on the local wildlife and questioned how long it would take to recover. A mason from Cox's Bazar who shared his perceptions concerning habitat loss said: "Many trees and forests were cleared to accommodate the Rohingyas. Different animals like elephants and birds used to live in those forests." A doctor with a medical practice in Cox's Bazar mentioned how groundwater levels had substantially depleted since 2017. A Dhaka-based academic termed that the environmental devastation which had taken place, particularly in the Ukhiya and Teknaf upazilas of Cox's Bazar amounted to ecocide.



Perceptions Of Social Impacts

Many respondents, particularly from the Chattogram division, shared that the prolonged presence of the Rohingya people had eroded the social fabric, especially in the regions where refugee camps were located. Echoing the findings of a 2018 study by COAST Trust, many of the professionals pointed out that as many good teachers left local educational institutions and colleges and took up employment in the humanitarian sector, leading to an apparent fall in the quality of

education offered at the institutions they left, leaving behind a trail of negative social consequences. Other respondents worried about the fate of children born from inter-community marriages and thus face legal and social identity challenges.

**Perceptions
of Integration and Granting
the Formal Right to Work**

Seeking host communities' opinion about possible integration of the Rohingyas in the backdrop of prolonged uncertainties over a large-scale repatriation, the study found mixed sentiment emerging. One respondent from the higher income group and three from the middle and low-income groups supported integration. According to a Dhaka-based academic, the Bangladesh government would most likely have to eventually consider locally integrating Rohingya FDMNs. However, for this to happen, it would have to bargain with the international community on what Bangladesh would be offered in return for allowing integration. A tailor from Rangpur who held a similar view said: "If the Rohingya FDMNs are not willing to return to their home country, and wish to work here, then the Government may consider providing them a place to stay."

All other respondents, who formed the overwhelming majority, strongly disagreed with integrating the Rohingyas with Bangladeshis. Respondents from Cox's Bazar reacted agitatedly when asked if they felt the Bangladeshi and Rohingya people could live together. While explaining why they were opposed to integration, it was clearly evident that they tend to 'other' the Rohingyas. A number of previous studies too have shown similar attitudes among the host community. "Amader shathe oder milbe nah" (We won't get along), said a homemaker from Cox's Bazar, because she felt that the Rohingyas, unlike Bangladeshis, are "hot-tempered" and "not sensible". A local politician believed that even sharing the same religious faith was insufficient to ensure they could socialise. "Our mentalities are very different", said an NGO worker from Cox's Bazar.

An important and surprising aspect of the perceptions of a sizeable number of respondents from beyond the Chattogram division was that they supported the Rohingyas' receiving the right to work. For instance, a Dalit social worker from Satkhira believed that if the Rohingya people continued to live in Bangladesh, the government would have to give them the right to work across several job sectors.

A government employee also stationed in Satkhira contended that granting the right to work through a proper policy would be a good idea because Rohingya FDMNs would not have to rely on foreign funds for survival. A representative from a UN agency shared a similar view. This person argued to create a precise ecosystem to determine who would do what kind of work.



Perceptions of Repatriation

All respondents across Bangladesh divisions supported repatriating the Rohingya FDMNs to Myanmar. However, many doubted the practicality of repatriation. There was a consensus that repatriation should occur only in a safe and dignified manner, with most professionals opposing forced repatriation. One respondent emphasised the importance of not forcing repatriation, suggesting a compassionate approach. Only a few individuals supported forced repatriation, citing concerns about the impact of their continued presence in the region.

Based on the findings, researchers' key recommendations included seeking international attention to make the repatriation a success, implementing programmes to address negative perceptions about the Rohingyas, addressing root causes of the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, and maintaining peaceful co-existence of the Rohingya FDMNs and Bangladeshi host people.



A low-angle, backlit photograph showing the silhouettes of a group of people, likely Rohingya, as they migrate across a grassy field. In the foreground, a woman carries a child on her back, holding a large umbrella. To the right, a man carries a long, rolled-up mat. The scene is set against a bright, clear sky with a few wispy clouds, creating a strong silhouette effect. The overall mood is one of displacement and journey.

Perception of Host Communities about Rohingya FDMNs

A Trend Analysis

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Confidence in national and international efforts for the repatriation of Rohingya FDMNs appears to have reached its lowest point, with only 1 percent of the host community in Ukhiya and Teknaf in Cox's Bazar district believing that Rohingyas will return to their country someday. Most other respondents expressed uncertainty about the prospect of repatriation and indicated that Rohingyas are unlikely to leave Bangladesh. A BRAC survey, conducted over a year ago but released recently, also found that women were the least convinced that Rohingyas would return to their homeland.

The brutal military operation by the Myanmar government in August 2017 forced the mass exodus of more than 700,000 Rohingyas to flee to Bangladesh. Nearly one million Rohingyas are currently living in camps in Bangladesh, the vast majority residing in 33 extremely congested camps, including the largest single site, the Kutupalong-Balukhali

Expansion Site, which hosts more than 635,000 Rohingya FDMNs. To alleviate overcrowding, 30,000 Rohingyas have been relocated to Noakhali's Bhasan Char in multiple phases from the Rohingya camps in Ukhiya and Teknaf since December 2020.

However, the expansion of these camps has disrupted the education of Rohingya children and caused deforestation, increasing the risk of landslides during the rainy season. Many Rohingya children are facing interruptions in their education, and there has been a rise in crime rates, including theft, robbery, drug usage, and human trafficking, inside and around the camps, causing concern among the adjacent local host communities.

Humanitarian agencies continue to provide emergency aid, but the living conditions in the camps remain challenging, with poor sanitation, sewer, and waste management, exposing Rohingyas to

contagious diseases like dengue. Frustration is mounting among the stateless Rohingyas regarding their future status, particularly tens of thousands of newborn babies.

The study indicates a significant challenge to the dignified repatriation of the Rohingyas. The Government of Bangladesh remains focused on voluntary repatriation in safe, dignified, and sustainable conditions as the primary solution to the Rohingya crisis. It also hopes for continued support from UNHCR and other international partners to respond to the massive humanitarian and protection needs of the Rohingyas and alleviate pressure on the Bangladeshi host community and existing facilities and services.

The prolonged stay of Rohingyas in the camps and uncertainties over their repatriation have strained the relationship between Rohingya and host communities, leading to bitterness due to multifaceted problems over the years, finds the study. Despite initial solidarity shown by local communities during the influx, the massive Rohingya FDMN settlement has precipitated a major livelihood crisis in Cox's Bazar, particularly affecting those engaged in informal wage labour. Consequently, solidarity has waned, and resentment has become widespread.

The congested camps have also adversely impacted the lives of host communities economically, socially, politically, environmentally, and in terms of security. With resource constraints, local communities are stressed, facing price hikes, inflation, and reduced wages in the labour market due to the presence of Rohingyas.

A survey of 456 individuals, randomly selected from Ukhia and Teknaf, revealed that perceptions of the negative impacts of sheltering Rohingyas are prevalent among host communities, particularly among those engaged in agricultural activities. They cited adverse effects such as price hikes, financial pressure, increased crime, land grabbing, insecurity, unemployment, disruption of everyday life, drug addiction, and conflicts with locals. Respondents also highlighted difficulties in accessing government services and noted disruptions to children's education and social-cultural erosion. Individuals were randomly selected for the survey, where 201 respondents were from three unions of Ukhia, and 255 were from three unions or municipalities of Teknaf. 82.7% of them live in rural areas. The ratio of male and female respondents is almost 50:50. Religion of nine out of ten respondents is Islam.

The average age of respondents was 37 years, and more than 50% were under 35 years old. 14.3% of respondents have education equivalent to Secondary School Certificate (SSC) or above; 18% of the respondents went to an informal Islamic educational institution known as Maktab.

Chart 1

Occupation of the Respondents





Chart 2

Income Category of Respondents





Perceptions of Negative Impacts of Sheltering Rohingyas

One-third of the respondents felt that the decision to provide shelter to the Rohingyas was wrong. Such feeling was higher among respondents aged between 35 and 44 who were engaged in agricultural work.

A prevalent view among the host community is that the presence of such a large number of Rohingyas has caused adversities like price hikes, financial pressure, and increased crime. Other pressing reasons for the negative perception were land grabbing, insecurity, an increase in unemployment, disruption of everyday life, increased drug addiction and conflict with locals.

In addition, respondents complained that the Rohingya crisis made it difficult to receive government services such as birth registration. Respondents observed an increase in extramarital affairs and other socio-cultural erosions. And these were found to be the reasons for having such negative perceptions among the host communities.




Perceptions of Positive Impacts of Sheltering Rohingyas

However, a smaller minority of host community respondents perceived the humanitarian values of sheltering Rohingyas, citing reasons such as humanitarian and religious grounds and the emergence of new opportunities in their areas, including job opportunities and infrastructure development.

Some respondents noted, “Rohingyas sell surplus food products. Thus, people of host communities can buy these products at a lower price. The educated but unemployed youth of the host communities got jobs. NGOs installed tubewells and latrines for local communities as well.” Some

respondents noted a noticeable rise in extremism, conflicts with locals, trafficking of women and children, sex trade, drug usage, criminal activities, and infectious diseases. They also mentioned that environmental degradation occurred in the Rohingya camps and the surrounding host communities.

Figure 1: Perception of positive impact
for providing shelter of Rohingyas





Repatriation of Rohingyas

Regarding repatriation, most respondents felt it was uncertain, with only 1% believing Rohingyas would return to their country. Many Rohingyas prefer to stay in Bangladesh due to perceived security and peace compared to Myanmar. Respondents expressed frustration about the lack of progress in repatriation, anticipating negative long-term impacts such as increased criminal activities and declining livelihood opportunities for locals.


Most of the respondents expressed that the Rohingyas are still living in Bangladesh because it is more secure and peaceful compared to Myanmar. More than half of the respondents opined that the repatriation of Rohingyas is not taking place due to the lack of diplomatic prowess of the Government of Bangladesh.

When asked about the likely scenario of Rohingyas staying longer, most of the respondents anticipated a rise in criminal. Almost one-third of the respondents noted that there would be a decline in the livelihood opportunities for the people living in local communities.

Perceptions varied on the relationship between Rohingyas and host communities, with many favouring limited interactions, particularly for work and businesses, and expressing concerns about security risks and social issues. Less than 20 percent of the respondents supported marital relationships between people from Rohingyas and host communities.

A respondent of host communities said, “There should be a friendly relationship because in case they do not get access to food, they might attack us.” Some respondents opined that good people in local communities would not keep any relationship with them, but evil people could maintain a relationship for illicit purposes.

Figure 2: Why are Rohingyas
Still Living in Bangladesh?



Bhasan Char and the Rohingyas

Host Perception

Regarding the relocation of Rohingyas to Bhasan Char, almost two-thirds of the respondents supported the government's decision, believing it would reduce population pressure, environmental degradation, and create work opportunities. However, some expressed concerns about the feasibility of repatriation and potential negative impacts on crime and migration.

Those who supported relocation to Bhashan Char were largely from the age group 25-34 years having a secondary degree or higher. In addition, where the head of household was a service support for shifting Rohingyas to Bhashan char was higher. On the other hand, 23% of the respondents opined that the relocation of the Rohingyas to Bhasan Char was incorrect. Among them, most of them thought that it would be difficult to send the Rohingyas

back to Myanmar. Half of them believed that the Rohingyas could easily migrate elsewhere in the country from Bhasan Char. Almost all of the respondents appreciated the increased security measures taken by the government in Cox's Bazar.

Way forward

Perception about measures that government should take

Looking ahead, respondents suggested measures such as diplomatic negotiations for repatriation, maintaining law and order, and creating work opportunities. They emphasised the need for government support in the absence of repatriation, including job creation, financial assistance, and social safety nets.

More than a quarter of the respondents opined that forcefully sending the Rohingyas back to Myanmar. Only 9% of the respondents opined that permanent rehabilitation of the Rohingyas. When asked if the repatriation

process does not materialise what actions they expect from the government, more than three-quarters of the respondents opined that the government should create more work opportunities for the people of local communities. 66.8% and 58.6% of the respondents said that the government should provide financial assistance and social safety net to the local communities respectively. Around half of the respondents expressed that the government should separate the Rohingyas from the local communities.

Perception about measures that **international communities should take**

International communities were urged to pressure Myanmar for repatriation and continue funding for Rohingyas' basic needs. Almost two-thirds of the respondents opined that the international community should pressurise the Government of Myanmar for the dignified repatriation of the Rohingyas. Around one-third of the respondents expressed that the aid agencies should continue funding to meet the Rohingyas' basic needs, such as shelter, education, healthcare, and so on. Less than 20% of the respondents stated that international communities should arrange safe zones for the Rohingyas in the Rakhine state.

In conclusion, there's a call for more support for host communities alongside the camps and efforts to ensure essential services and livelihood opportunities for Rohingyas to prevent social tensions and illegal activities.





Protective Security of Adolescents in the Rohingya Camps

Dr. Helal Mohiuddin

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The Rohingya adolescents are particularly affected by the 2017 brutal exodus, with over half of the Rohingyas in Bangladesh being children and youth under 19 years old. About half of them are teenagers. A recent study by BRAC shows that traditional family roles, once a source of safety for adolescents, are deteriorating in the camps. Household environments have become more unsafe for Rohingya boys and girls. Nuptiality is the main reason for girls. Household members want to get rid of girls by wedding them out by any means.

Marriage is often used as a way to lessen the burden on families, especially for girls. Forced and early marriages are common, worsening the protective security crises. Girls face polygamy, deception, and extramarital affairs from their husbands. Child marriage is not prohibited, rather widely practiced in the camps. “I used to live with my uncle’s family. My aunt wanted to get

rid of me. So, she chose a groom for me. The men took me to his sister’s place. I thought it would be a real better place for me. Soon, I sensed, then realised, and got ascertained that they have evil plots to engage me in evil jobs or even worse acts. I escaped returned to my uncle’s place. My husband neither did come to take me back nor received my phone call. My uncle and aunt treat me like a parasite. Both even term me a ‘whore’. The mental torture they perpetrate on me every day since then is worse than death. I often think about committing suicide or truly escaping for doing anything anywhere other than this hell”. – one of the Rohingya girl told it, who preferred to remain anonymous.

This story isn’t isolated; many girls and women face similar situations. Marital discord contributes significantly to these protection issues, with girls bearing the brunt of the consequences. In the study, the most common response

that adolescents delivered were that 1) ‘protective security’ deterioration is much more prevalent than ‘protective security’ attainment, and 2) protective security challenges are ‘stressors’ that put enormous psychological pressure on them. The study identifies four major stressors affecting adolescents’ security: nuptiality-driven, socialisation-driven, disorganisation-driven, and mental health-driven vulnerabilities. The breakdown of traditional family roles is a common theme, with households increasingly becoming unsafe environments for Rohingya adolescents.

There are two common features of adolescents' protective security challenges: 1) acute mistrust of social and institutional support systems, and 2) constant fear of being under surveillance and victimised by 'unknown (and invisible) enemies. NGO interventions have reduced physical abuse of girls, but gender-based violence (GBV) persists. New forms of gender-based violence, including predatory demands and sexual aggression, are reported. In-laws are never good support. Adolescent girls frequently report anxiety about abandonment and male guardians' neglect. Boys face unrealistic expectations to earn or become self-reliant at a young age, leading to physical abuse and neglect.

This research also finds that both family and communal living environments are increasingly insecure for adolescents. Domestic violence, polygamy, and extramarital affairs are

rampant, undermining families' roles as the central agents of socialisation. Protective security for adolescents is on the brink of collapse.

Early marriage for girls and polygamy for men exacerbate security vulnerabilities. Girl's report escalating mental health issues, including psychosis and homicidal tendencies. Nuptiality forces girls to undergo vulnerabilities such as forced relationships, trafficking, and exploitative labour. Boys are more likely to attempt escaping the camps, taking risks to settle in other countries. Girls often speak positively about NGO interventions, while boys are critical of them.

Rohingya adolescents fear intra-community conflicts, including Rohingya vs. Rohingya clashes and tensions between the host community and Rohingyas. These conflicts intensify feelings of insecurity and helplessness among adolescents. Various security

challenges, including cheating, violence, trafficking and radicalisation are prevalent. Sexual violence is also increasing, with boys being the least reported victims. Sexual abuse of boys, as the male adolescents reflect, is least reported in books. There are little or no legal and psycho-social supports for male rape victims. Most boys tend to conceal their trauma due to stigma, Lack of male-focusd support, and fear of backlash. Rohingya boys are equally vulnerable to sexual predation and exploitation as girls, more by adult men, and in rare instances by women as well. Forced incest is another alarming security threat for girls. Adolescents from the host community and camp-dwelling teenagers form bonds that often lead to criminal activities, exacerbating tensions between communities.

Adolescents' personal security concerns hinder their participation in development programmes, including education and skill training. They are fearful that many prying eyes and surveillance mechanisms are well in place, especially from radically and criminally oriented organisations and groups. It is becoming much riskier for them to cooperate with GO-NGO actors for their development. Personal safety concerns prevent them from taking positive decisions such as going to schools, taking skill development training, or serving the community as volunteers. A strong sense of mistrust towards community elders and law enforcement prevails among Rohingya adolescents. Boys feel neglected in NGO interventions, which they perceive as primarily focusing on girls' issues. They perceive these programmes as insufficient entry engaging, leaving them vulnerable to risky activities.

Adolescents want proactive rather than reactive interventions. They advocate for programmes that build resilience, preparedness, and resistance to security challenges. They also emphasise the importance of solidarity-building among Rohingya youth.

The impact, thus, is counterproductive. They outlined the idle minds among boys become susceptible to harmful influences. With overwhelming free time-boys are prone to radicalisation and crime syndication and increasingly drawn to drug and arms trafficking due to lack of purpose and income.

The study amplifies the voices of adolescent informants, proving valuable as they share opinions and new perspectives. One recurring complaint from adolescents about GO-NGO-led security interventions is their reactive nature, focusing on

post-incident rather than proactive or preventative measures. While adolescents appreciate awareness-raising and conscientisation programmes, they believe that human rights and legal support tend to be reactive rather than preventative. Their suggestions often emphasise preparedness, resilience, and strengthening resistive capabilities.

In response to emerging crises, Rohingya adolescents highlight increasing peer-group violence among teenagers as a pressing issue to address through brotherhood-building interventions, not militaristic force. They point to deliberate efforts to stoke enmity among teenagers and recommend that NGOs create programmes focused on Rohingya adolescent livelihood development through solidarity building.

Adolescents identify fast-growing con-networks as major threats, exploiting their vulnerability and lack of voice. They lack familial and community support against these exposures and seek additional protection beyond law enforcement initiatives. The rise of networks involved in gold and Yaba smuggling, firearms, and sharp weapons manufacturing is a growing concern.

Corporal punishment is reported as a major threat to adolescents' emotional and physical security. Strict supervision further undermines adolescent security. Many adolescents live with custodians or guardians who believe that religious schools (madrasahs) are the best way to discipline them, often leading to harsh physical abuse and long-term mental health issues.

Rohingya adolescents find existing institutional measures adequate but raise concerns about their exclusion from decision-making, diminishing sense of safety, waning motivation, and feelings of dependence. They view most GO-NGO initiatives as moderately effective but unsustainable due to funding dependencies.

Adolescents report a rising tide of prejudice, suspicion, and hostility towards Rohingyas, not only from the host community but also within the camp administration and service-providing organisations. They fear unfair treatment, including indiscriminate arrests and punishment for minor offenses.

Newly identified security concerns include family challenges, unreported sexual violence, internal conflicts among Rohingyas, intentional delinquent friendships, surveillance fears, unique criminal victimisation, gender discrimination against boys, inappropriate protection approaches, organised con networks, peer-group violence, corporal punishment, and illicit networks exploiting low electrification. Despite these challenges, adolescents emphasise the importance of resilience-building for their well-being and happiness. Rohingya adolescents in Cox's Bazar camps face multiple protection vulnerabilities but often feel unheard. While there are comprehensive GO-NGO protection programmes, they lack specific adolescent-focused livelihood development activities. The study underscores the need for tailored interventions that involve adolescents in decision-making and address their unique challenges.

To restore adolescent **Protective Security**



One-stop-crisis centres offering counselling, sports, education and life-skill training.



NGO interventions that honour adolescents' dignity, self-worth, creative expression, and developmental potential.



Adolescent-driven community-building projects focusing on physical and mental health security and personal protection training.

Recommendations



Rohingya-sensitive training for adolescents.



Enhanced GO-NGO coordination and joint planning.




Engagement of Majhis and imams for safety reporting.



Family-based protective security awareness programmes.



Comparative studies on security and protection in Cox's Bazar and Bhashan Char.




Birth control and family planning initiatives.



Establishment of adolescent-centric safe spaces.





Nature of Aggressive Behavioural Tendencies Among the Rohingya Communities Myths and Realities

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Rohingyas who witnessed violence have significantly higher violent ideation, anxiety and depression compared to those who have not witnessed it and nearly half of the newly displaced Rohingyas reported witnessing killings or acts of extreme violence compared to those who fled Myanmar decades ago. These are among a few crucial findings of a recent study on the tendencies of aggressive behaviour within the Rohingya community jointly carried out by BRAC and Dhaka University's Department of Educational and Counselling Psychology.

The study titled 'Prevalence and Nature of Aggressive Behavioural Tendencies among the Rohingya Communities: Myths and Realities' was aimed at finding out violence exposure and behavioural and psychological symptoms of the Rohingya community in Bangladesh. The research found that the rate of being abused by family members, be it physically or

emotionally and family negligence is higher among the newly displaced Rohingyas. Results indicate that the males are significantly more physically aggressive than the females. Interestingly, the females are significantly more verbally aggressive and hostile than the males. The old Rohingyas have more violent thoughts compared to the new Rohingyas and the host community.

With over a million Rohingyas residing in Bangladesh, often referred to as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs), the region has seen a significant influx due to ethnic and religious persecution in Myanmar's Rakhine state. The Rohingya population has endured longstanding ethnic and religious persecution in Myanmar for decades, and many of them have fled to other countries in Southeast Asia, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. However, most Rohingya people fled from the Rakhine

state of Myanmar to Bangladesh. The number of Rohingya FDMNs in Bangladesh has increased rapidly for the escalated violence in Myanmar. According to the UN Refugee Agency report, more than 723,000 Rohingyas have fled to Bangladesh since 25 August 2017. Before the huge influx of the community in 2017, there were a good number of Rohingya in Bangladesh, who took shelter in Bangladesh before 2017. The study categorised the Rohingya FDMNs into 'old' Rohingyas, who arrived before 2017, and 'new' Rohingyas, who fled after this period, to understand any generational differences in their experiences and behaviours.

The objectives of the research were to investigate the nature and prevalence of violent ideation and aggressive behaviour among young Rohingya adults and the host community; to investigate whether there was any exposure of violence on

psychological states (such as stress, anxiety, depression and aggression) on Rohingya and host community; and to look into whether psychosocial support affects emotional healing and behavioural changes of the young Rohingya adults.

The study employed surveys, psychometric scales, FGD to capture both quantitative and qualitative data.

A cross-sectional survey was conducted with 1,244 participants to measure their current levels of aggression, violent ideation, stress, anxiety, and depression. Additionally, In-depth Interviews (IDIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted to explore the participants' experiences and perceptions in-depth. In-Depth Interviews (IDIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted as part of the

qualitative data collection. The first objective was to measure the nature and prevalence of violent ideation and aggressive behaviour among young Rohingya adults and the host community. To achieve this objective, the percentage of family-related adverse experiences and exposure to violence were calculated for three groups (New Rohingya, Old Rohingya, and Host). Correlations between violent ideation and aggressive behaviour scores



were calculated for the entire sample and different groups. Family-related adverse experiences among three groups show that the rate of drug addicted (heroin and yabba) among the old Rohingya (43.2%) is higher than new Rohingya (32.4%) and host community (24.3%). The rate of punishment through justice/law system for criminal activities, mentally sick family members and the rate of exposure to family violence or abuse or torture are also higher among the old Rohingya. On the other hand, the rate of being physically abused by family members, emotional abuse by family members and family negligence is higher among the new Rohingyas.

Among 1,244 respondents, 1,134 answered that they often hear stories of someone being killed or being a victim of extreme violence and responses were similar for both Old and New Rohingyas. However, nearly half of the New Rohingyas reported witnessing someone being killed or being a victim of extreme violence compared to

the Old Rohingyas and the host community. Old Rohingyas reported experiencing addictive items like heroin or yabba (47.4%). Similar responses were received from Old and New Rohingyas for question of receiving any type of counselling for emotional support. It shows host communities have very little access to such services.

The survey found that the earlier-displaced Rohingya population exhibited higher levels of violent ideation compared to the New Rohingyas and the Host community. Results show that significant differences exist among these three groups. The females have significantly more violent thoughts than the males.

Regarding anxiety, victims are more anxious than non-victims among all three groups. A significant difference exists regarding the stress of the new Rohingyas. Victims are more stressed than non-victims. The old Rohingya victims scored

higher on total anxiety and depression (PHQ4) and stress. Victims of host communities also scored higher on depression, Total PHQ4, stress and anxiety than the non-victims. Significant differences were found among new, old Rohingyas and host communities regarding violent ideation.

It was found that those who witnessed violence have significantly higher violent ideation, anxiety and depression compared to those who have not witnessed violence. However, in the case of stress, no significant difference was found. A significant difference exists between witnessing violence and not witnessing in the areas of depression and total PHQ4 scores of new Rohingyas. That is, among new Rohingyas, those exposed to violence/witnessed violence have higher depression and total PHQ4 scores than those who did not witness such violence.

THE STUDY SHOWS THAT VIOLENT IDEATION, ANXIETY, DEPRESSION, STRESS, AND AGGRESSION OF THE YOUNG FEMALES WHO RECEIVED COUNSELLING SERVICES FROM THE NGOS HAVE A HIGHER SCORE THAN THEIR MALE COUNTERPARTS. FEMALES SCORED HIGHER ON ALL MEASURES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES- VIOLENT IDEATION, ANXIETY, DEPRESSION, TOTAL PHQ4 AND STRESS. MALES ARE IN BETTER PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES COMPARED TO FEMALES WHO TOOK COUNSELLING.

Old Rohingyas reported having addictive items like heroin or yabba (47.4%), which is much higher than the new Rohingyas and the host community. Based on voluntary disclosure by the old Rohingyas the study found that more family members of old Rohingyas were addicted to drugs like Yabba or heroin. The host community reported fewer such incidents. When asked about receiving counselling services for emotional wellbeing, similar responses were obtained from the old and new Rohingyas, whereas host communities have very little to no access to such services.

In the total aggressive behaviour score, there was no significant difference among the three groups, though, among the subscales, i.e., Physical Aggression, Verbal Aggression, Anger & Hostility, there are some significant differences. Regarding verbal aggression, a significant difference was found among them. Older Rohingya

individuals exhibit higher levels of verbal aggression to express their anger than the host and new Rohingya adults. Also, in the case of showing hostility, the difference among the three groups was found to be significant. The old Rohingyas and hosts showed significantly more hostility than the new Rohingyas. Hostility characterises the cognitive component of aggressive behaviour. It does not imply they act out their aggression.

It has been found that there were no significant differences among new, old, and host communities regarding physical aggression and anger. Rohingyas or not, all have a similar level of anger in them and, they exhibit physical acts likewise out of aggression. However, when considering all four types of aggression, no differences were found between the new and old Rohingyas and the host communities. This is a pivotal insight that challenges prevailing assumptions. The qualitative research also

revealed that aggression is similar for both Rohingyas and the host community. Therefore, the myth of Rohingya people being more aggressive, uncouth and barbarian might not be true at all. It is only a myth.

Statistically, a significant difference exists between males and females regarding physical aggression, verbal aggression, and hostility but not in anger. Anger is the emotional or affective component that indicates psychological stimulation and grounding for aggression. Males and females have similar feelings of anger. Males were found to be more physically aggressive than females, which matched their societal norm and the biological factors of the male being more physically strong and aggressive.

On the other hand, females were verbally more aggressive, which can also be explained by their societal norms. As expressing physical aggression among women is discouraged

in our society, women are more prone to use verbal aggression (quarrelling, using abusive words, cursing, etc.) to vent their anger. Regarding hostility, females were more hostile than males, which can be explained as hostility has been defined as a cognitive component of aggressive behaviour—not acting out aggressively. Instead, hostility is closer to violent ideation/thoughts. The qualitative part of the study examined the nature and effects of aggressive behaviours. It is found that females use verbal aggression and males use physical aggression (fighting, destroying property, beating/hitting dependents etc.).

Violent ideation scores among the three groups revealed significant differences among the respondents (old and new Rohingyas and hosts). The old Rohingya adults have more violent thoughts compared to the new Rohingyas. Host community scored the least. It is understandable that the host

community leads a much respectful life, enjoys the utilities and other facilities of the country, has access to almost anything and everything, and does not suffer from identity crises compared to the Rohingya community. These quantitative findings have been reflected in the qualitative results too. Rohingya communities are not considered the citizens of Bangladesh. They are forcefully displaced from their homeland. Insecurity, uncertainty, humiliation are part of their lives now. Respect as a human being is at stake. All these might give rise to violent thoughts. The explanation of the old Rohingya adults having more violent ideation could be due to their extended stay as displaced persons, getting into fights with local people, getting not enough support from NGOs as the new Rohingyas get etc.

Old Rohingya adults also indicate significant differences in all measures except depression. Regarding depression, no differences were found among victims and non-victims. At the same time, the new Rohingya victims differed significantly from the non-victims in all measures except depression and PHQ4 (total depression and anxiety score). As in the present study, only a two-item measure was used to identify depression. It might not yield the actual scenario. Another point to consider is that the number of sessions, type of sessions, language etc., have not been taken into consideration. It is crucial to remember that psychological services are mainly available to the Rohingya community through MHPSS. The host community cannot avail of this service. Therefore, the participants who have received psychological services are mainly the Rohingyas.

Recommendations

Basic Needs and Livelihoods

Ensure access to essential services such as food, shelter, education, and healthcare for all Rohingya communities.

Empowerment and Productivity

Engage male Rohingya FDMNs in productive activities and explore opportunities for national legitimacy and rights recognition.

Safe Repatriation and Safety Mechanisms

Facilitate safe and secure repatriation to Myanmar while improving safety mechanisms within Rohingya camps to ensure the well-being of all community members.

Addressing Gender-Based Violence

Implement community-based interventions to address gender-based violence, focusing on awareness-raising and youth engagement programmes.

Psychosocial Support and Mental Health

Increase access to psychosocial support services within the camps and host communities, ensuring that both male and female Rohingya FDMNs receive adequate mental health care.

Cultural Integration and Cohesion

Engage community members in cultural activities and heritage preservation to foster a sense of identity and belonging among the Rohingya communities.

Prevention and Awareness

Develop and disseminate contextualised Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) materials to raise awareness about the negative impacts of abuse and violence within families and communities.

THE FINDINGS HIGHLIGHT THE URGENT NEED FOR TARGETED INTERVENTIONS TO ADDRESS THE UNDERLYING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE, ENSURING THE WELL-BEING AND SAFETY OF ALL COMMUNITY MEMBERS. POLICYMAKERS, HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS, AND STAKEHOLDERS SHOULD CONSIDER THESE RECOMMENDATIONS TO DEVELOP HOLISTIC AND SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS THAT PROMOTE PEACE, SECURITY, AND WELL-BEING FOR THE ROHINGYA COMMUNITIES IN BANGLADESH AND BEYOND.



BLOCK B-36
ROHINGYA REFUGEE
NEW CAMP
MAAZI PH 0197/0538
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BRAC
কক্সবাজার জেলাধীন শিশু ও কিশোরী-কিশোরী
জন্য সুরক্ষিত পরিবেশ সৃষ্টি প্রকল্প
★ আমাদের জায়গা
শিশুবান্ধব কেন্দ্র
বালুখালী মেডিক্যাল সেন্টারের
পাশে, কক্সবাজার।





Evaluative Research on BRAC Programmes in the Rohingya Camps of Cox's Bazar


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In response to the escalating humanitarian needs, BRAC has actively engaged in the Humanitarian Crisis Management Programme (HCMP) in Cox's Bazar, collaborating closely with the Government of Bangladesh and various non-state actors, including UN agencies and NGOs. To assess the effectiveness of HCMP, BRAC initiated a comprehensive study through an independent research firm, focusing on five key sectors: food security, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), health, protection, and education.

The study encompassed a thorough evaluation of each component, surveying 384 households from BRAC intervention camps and 192 households from Non-BRAC intervention camps, resulting in a total sample size of 2,880 households. The objective was to conduct comparative analyses between BRAC and Non-BRAC camps, shedding light on the distinctive features, strengths, and potential

weaknesses of BRAC's interventions in comparison to other agencies involved in addressing the Rohingya crisis.

The evaluation process involved the use of HCMP indicators and employed various research methodologies, including sample surveys, focus group discussions, and key informant interviews. Through these means, the study sought to gauge the programme outcomes and identify areas where BRAC's interventions differ, excel, or may require enhancement in the ongoing response to the Rohingya crisis.



**Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
(WASH)**

The water supply situation is significantly better in camps where BRAC has intervened, with approximately 75.3% of respondents in these camps reporting a consistent water supply at the source (tap or tubewell). This is in comparison to 69.8% in non-intervention camps. Moreover, a high percentage, 97.7% in intervention camps and 97.9% in non-intervention camps, affirmed that the water was suitable for both drinking and other purposes.

Despite the improved water availability, it was observed that collecting water took less time in non-intervention camps. In BRAC intervention camps, the average round trip time was 11 minutes and 9 seconds, whereas in non-BRAC intervention camps, it was found to be 6 minutes and 46 seconds. This significant difference may be attributed to geographic variations in the locations of Rohingya camps.

Concerning water container hygiene, a comparable percentage of clean containers was found in both types of camps, with 95.6% in intervention camps and 94.3% in non-intervention camps. Additionally, the incidence of acute water-borne diarrhoea (AWD) was slightly higher in non-intervention camps, with rates of 4.9% in BRAC camps compared to 5.2% in non-BRAC camps.

The majority of respondents, 99.2% from intervention camps and 95.3% from non-intervention camps, utilised pit latrines with slabs. On average, 34 individuals shared a toilet in both types of camps. Approximately 94.3% of latrines were serviced by NGOs, with similar rates observed in both intervention (94.4%) and non-intervention (94.8%) camps. Toilet leakage or overflow issues were reported by about 32% of respondents, with a higher incidence in non-intervention camps (30.2% in intervention camps compared to 34.9% in non-intervention camps).

Garbage collection services were reported by 82% of respondents in intervention camps and 94.8% in non-intervention camps. Household waste was typically stored in dustbins, with NGO volunteers responsible for collection. Some respondents mentioned resorting to throwing trash into drains due to the absence of nearby dustbins.

Personal bathing facilities were reported by 71.5% of respondents, with 68.5% in BRAC camps and 77.6% in non-BRAC camps. Community bathing facilities were used by 43% and 31.3% in BRAC and non-BRAC camps, respectively. The preference for personal bathing facilities was attributed to the inconvenience of fetching water from outside in community bathing facilities. Water availability for handwashing was reported by 81.5% of households in intervention camps and 77.6% in non-intervention camps. Soap or detergent was found in 77% of households, with higher rates in intervention camps (79.9%) compared to non-intervention camps (77.1%). Knowledge of the three critical times for handwashing was reported by 71.6% in intervention camps and 78.6% in non-intervention camps.

Areas for improvement include enhancing water supply to community bathing facilities, addressing the cleanliness of toilets through the appointment of paid volunteers, implementing cleaning schedules in BRAC intervention camps, supplying cleaning materials to users for maintaining cleanliness, and prioritising hygiene promotion sessions for overall sanitation improvement.



**Food
Security**

Around 83% of participants were involved in agricultural activities. Interestingly, the percentage of engagement was higher in non-intervention camps (86.5%) compared to BRAC intervention camps (81.25%). Regardless of the camp type, over 90% of participants received training in homestead vegetable gardening, and most obtained various agricultural inputs, though input types varied by camp. Non-intervention camp participants often received booklets and chemical fertilizer, while intervention camp participants received nets, rope, and seedlings more frequently.

Both types of camps showed no significant difference in the variety of vegetables grown, with bottle gourd, sweet gourd, bitter gourd, snake gourd, cucumber, and beans being the primary crops. The majority of these vegetables were used to fulfil basic home food requirements.

Coping behaviours were prevalent in both intervention and non-intervention camps, with "relying on less preferred and less expensive food" being a common practice. The average Reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI) was slightly lower in non-intervention camps (13.12) compared to intervention camps (14.25), indicating a higher level of coping in households within intervention camps.

Food consumption scoring, utilising Food Consumption Score (FCS) cut-offs, revealed that 19.8% of households in intervention camps had poor or borderline consumption, while the percentage was slightly higher at 20.3% in non-intervention camps. Consequently, a higher proportion of households in intervention camps demonstrated acceptable FCS.

Areas for improvement include the need for more widespread distribution of nets for plant protection and increased awareness through sensitisation programmes about the nutritional value of vegetables and the importance of planting different varieties.



Health

The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends a minimum of four Antenatal Care (ANC) supports during pregnancy, and there is no significant difference in knowledge between respondents from BRAC and non-BRAC camps (75.3% in BRAC camps vs. 74.5% in non-BRAC camps). In practice, a higher proportion of women in BRAC intervention camps (76.6%) received the recommended number of ANC compared to those in non-intervention camps (70.3%).

Around 55.2% of women from both BRAC and non-BRAC camps were aware of the appropriate time for the first ANC visit. In practice, 59.9% of women in non-BRAC camps and 53.4% in BRAC camps made their first visit at the recommended time. Tetanus Toxoid (TT) vaccination coverage was slightly lower in BRAC camps (92.6%) compared to non-BRAC camps (95.2%).

Home delivery rates were higher in non-intervention camps (78.1%) compared to intervention camps (55.5%). In intervention camps, 76.7% of deliveries were assisted by medically trained personnel, whereas in non-intervention camps, only 59.3% sought assistance from medically trained individuals during childbirth.

Awareness of contraceptive methods was high in both intervention (99.2%) and non-intervention (99.5%) camps. Actual contraceptive use was reported by 68.8% of women in intervention camps and 70.3% in non-intervention camps.

High vaccination rates were observed for BCG (99.7%) and Polio (97.4%) in both intervention and non-intervention camps. Complete dosages of Penta 3 were received by 75.8% of children overall (74% in intervention, 79% in non-intervention camps).

Timely initiation of breastfeeding was reported by 92.4% of women in intervention camps and 93.2% in non-intervention camps. Exclusive breastfeeding was practiced by 69.4% of women, with a slightly higher rate in non-intervention camps (72.9%). Timely initiation of complementary feeding was higher in non-intervention camps (95.8% vs. 88.8% in BRAC camps). Around 72% of children received a diversified diet, with no significant difference between BRAC and non-BRAC camps. Knowledge and preventive measures were high in both BRAC and non-BRAC camps, with 99% of women aware of COVID-19 symptoms. Common preventive measures included wearing face masks (90.5%), handwashing with soap/hand sanitizer (89.8%), and maintaining clean belongings (75.5%).

Areas for improvement include introducing child corners in Primary Health Centres (PHCs) to provide a designated space for women to attend to their children, enhancing awareness sessions targeting males to promote understanding and utilisation of family planning methods, ensuring that all PHCs have facilities for at least normal vaginal delivery, addressing the current lack of delivery services in most centres, implementing digitalisation across all activities to optimise time and resources efficiently, and conducting awareness campaigns emphasising the significance of timely initiation of the first ANC visit within the first four months of pregnancy.



#EndHumanTrafficking

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LEGAL SUPPORT

- ★ Legal Counselling
- ★ Mediation
- ★ Representation of people
- ★ Jail visit for relatives
- ★ Legal awareness session

Protection


The BRAC intervention has demonstrated positive outcomes in the protection environment for respondents in their camps, with 81.5% feeling very safe or moderately safe compared to 72.9% in non-intervention camps. In terms of protection-related services, 91.1% of respondents in intervention camps reported availability, while it was slightly lower at 85.9% in non-intervention camps. Both groups acknowledged the helpfulness of women-friendly centres and related activities.

Legal protection awareness was higher in intervention camps (91%) compared to non-intervention camps (81.2%), but actual utilisation of legal services was low. Only 13.3% from intervention camps and 8.3% from non-intervention camps availed of these services. More respondents in intervention camps (68.8%) were aware of referral services compared to non-intervention camps (58.3%).

In community-based protection mechanisms, a higher percentage of respondents from intervention camps (54.7%) participated compared to non-intervention camps (47.9%). Involvement in addressing GBV/protection-related issues was also higher in intervention camps (37.8% vs. 32.3%).

Regarding psychosocial counselling services, awareness was limited, with only around 42.4% and 41.1% of respondents from intervention and non-intervention camps, respectively, being aware of their availability. Skills development and empowerment programmes reached less than one-fourth of respondents in both intervention (24.6%) and non-intervention camps (26.8%). However, nearly all respondents in both camps found livelihood training useful (98.8% and 97.8%, respectively).

Areas for improvement include enhancing internal coordination among different interventions, increasing skill development training for Rohingya women, providing after-training support, encouraging the utilisation of legal and referral services, and sensitising women to seek protection services in cases of violence.



Education

Learning interventions, such as Learning Centres (LC), Early Childhood Development Centres (ECD), Junior Secondary, Adolescent Centres, and Myanmar Curriculum Education, were found in both BRAC intervention and non-intervention camps, according to survey respondents.

Children's enrolment in learning interventions revealed that 1-2 children attend school in the majority of BRAC intervention households (64.1%) and non-intervention households (70.3%). About 28.4% of respondents from BRAC intervention camps reported children dropping out of education, a percentage similar to non-intervention camps (28.1%). The majority of

school-going children in both camps were aged 6-14 years (79.0% and 84.0%, respectively), with boys comprising over half (50.8% and 55.7%). The Learning Centre (LC) was the primary choice for most children (45.0% in intervention camps, 47.6% in non-intervention camps).

Regarding literacy, around 94.6% and 95.3% of respondents in intervention and non-intervention camps, respectively, confirmed their children's ability to read. However, not all children who could read could also write, with 81.4% in intervention camps and 78.8% in non-intervention camps having both skills.

Educational materials were received by approximately 94% of children in intervention camps from BRAC LC/school, while in non-intervention camps, 92% received materials. Nearly all children attended LC/school daily (98.1% in intervention camps, 96.2% in non-intervention camps), with English being the preferred subject for most Rohingya children (70.3% in intervention camps, 67.5% in non-intervention camps).

The learning environment was generally perceived as safe and joyful, with 98.8% of respondents in intervention camps and 97.6% in non-intervention camps feeling their children were safe. However, there were disparities in amenities, with higher percentages in intervention camps for safe drinking water (97.3% vs. 82.1%), hand-washing facilities (97.9% vs. 91.5%), and separate toilet facilities (60% vs. 59%). Recreational facilities were more prevalent in intervention camps (77.1% vs. 57.5%), and awareness of parent meetings was higher in intervention camps (91.4% vs. 89.1%).

Parental satisfaction was high, with 98% in both intervention and non-intervention camps expressing satisfaction with their childrens' learning. Satisfaction with the teaching ability of instructors was also high, with 96% in intervention camps and 94.8% in non-intervention camps.

Areas for improvement include addressing the limited availability of menstrual hygiene facilities, ensuring separate facilities for adolescents, and strengthening awareness campaigns to enhance adolescent girls' access to education.

Glossary of **Key Terms**

ADB

Asian Development Bank — a regional development bank promoting social and economic development in Asia and the Pacific.

ASRH

Adolescent Sexual and Reproductive Health — services and rights focused on young people's reproductive wellbeing.

Bhashan Char

A remote island in the Bay of Bengal developed by the Bangladesh government to relocate a portion of the Forcibly Displaced of Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs).

CDF

Credit and Development Forum — a platform for microfinance institutions and development partners in Bangladesh.

CGE

Computable General Equilibrium- An economic modeling technique used to simulate how policy changes or shocks affect an economy, particularly useful in forecasting livelihood and employment impacts.

CRC

Convention on the Rights of the Child — a United Nations human rights treaty adopted in 1989, which sets out the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights of all children.

CSO

Civil Society Organization — a non-governmental organization representing interests of citizens and communities.

Durable Solutions

Sustainable and long-term responses to displacement including repatriation, local integration, or third-country resettlement.

FDMNs

Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals — the official term used by the Government of Bangladesh to refer to Rohingya refugees.

FGD

Focus Group Discussion — a qualitative research method used to collect opinions or perceptions.

GBV

Gender-Based Violence — harmful acts committed against individuals based on

their gender, including physical, sexual, psychological, and economic abuse.

HNPP

Health, Nutrition, and Population Programme- A flagship program by BRAC (and other NGOs) focusing on integrated health services, including in refugee and underserved areas.

Host Community

Bangladeshi citizens, particularly in Cox's Bazar and Teknaf, living adjacent to the refugee camps and impacted by the Rohingya influx.

Imam

A religious leader in the Muslim community; plays a key role in community mobilization and counseling.

Majhi

Informal Rohingya camp leader selected by authorities to act as a liaison between camp residents and officials.

MDG

Millennium Development Goals — were eight global targets set by the United Nations in 2000 to address major development challenges by 2015.

MHPSS

Mental Health and Psychosocial Support— services and interventions that address mental wellbeing in humanitarian crises.

Protection Desk

A designated space within refugee settings where community members can report safety risks and access protective services.

Rohingya

A stateless Muslim minority group from Rakhine State, Myanmar, persecuted and forced to flee due to ethnic violence.

RRRC

Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner- Bangladesh government's coordinating body for managing the Rohingya crisis, under the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR). The RRRC is based in Cox's Bazar.

SAM

Social Accounting Matrix- A comprehensive, economy-wide database capturing transactions between all sectors (households, firms,

government), used for economic modeling and policy analysis.

SDG

Sustainable Development Goals— a set of 17 global goals adopted by the United Nations in 2015. They aim to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure prosperity for all by 2030.

SEA

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse— misconduct involving abuse of power or trust in sexual contexts.

SEZ

Special Economic Zone— a designated area within a country with special economic regulations to attract investment and industrialization.

Speed Money

Informal or illegal payments made to expedite service or gain access— a common form of petty corruption.

SRHR

Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights— the rights and services relating to sexuality and reproduction.

ToR

Terms of Reference— a document outlining the scope, objectives, and structure of a project or agreement.

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees— the UN agency responsible for the protection of refugees.

VLR

Voluntary Local Review— a local-level reporting framework aligned with the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

WASH

Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene— a sector in humanitarian and development programming ensuring clean water and hygienic conditions.

WB

World Bank— an international financial institution that provides loans, grants, and technical assistance to developing countries to reduce poverty and support economic development.

List of **Acronyms**

AWD

Acute Water-borne Diarrhea

BAU

Business-as-Usual

DAC

Development Assistance Committee

GoB

Government of Bangladesh

HCMP

Humanitarian Crisis
Management Programme

HIES

Household Income and Expenditure Survey

HRP

Humanitarian Response Plan

HSC

Higher Secondary School Certificate

IASC

Inter-Agency Standing Committee

ICRC

International Committee
of the Red Cross

IDPs

Internally Displaced Persons

IFRC

International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies

INGOs

International Non-Governmental
Organizations

IOM

International Organization
for Migration

ISCG

Inter-Sector Coordination Group

MoDMR

Ministry of Disaster Management
and Relief

NGOs

Non-Governmental Organizations

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development

PSEA

Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and
Abuse

PHC

Primary Health Centre

RCRC

Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement

RRP

Refugee Response Plan

SDGs

Sustainable Development Goals

SSC

Secondary School Certificate

TT

Tetanus Toxoid

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNDS

United Nations Development System

UNFPA

United Nations Population Fund

UNICEF

United Nations International Children's
Emergency Fund

UNOCHA

United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

VAW

Violence Against Women

WFP

World Food Programme

WHO

World Health Organization

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