




Social Cohesion **between the Rohingya and Host Communities** in Cox's Bazar

Advocacy for Social Change



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Executive Summary

Keeping the discussion on repatriation at the centre, this study explores various measures and obstacles in facilitating a cohesive environment in Ukhiya and Teknaf for peaceful coexistence between the Rohingya and the host community. To this end, a mixed-method study combining qualitative and quantitative methods was conducted in different refugee camps and host societies to assess the impact of the Rohingya influx, the resulting problems, opportunities, and hindrances caused by the influx facilitators and barriers to peaceful coexistence. Finally, an operational framework for meaningful social cohesion between Rohingyas and hosts has been designed by reviewing the study's significant findings.

In line with the above objectives, this study was conducted in November 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic. It employed some qualitative methods to explore the real situations in the fields, including in-depth interviews, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions. The observation was also employed throughout the study. In addition to the qualitative methods, a sample survey (n=903) was conducted in both Rohingya camps and host societies to validate the gathered information and obtain new

findings. Participants were selected purposively from different locations for qualitative exploration, and quantitative data were collected, resorting to multistage random sampling in both camps and host societies. To ensure representation of all possible stakes and views (both emic and etic), Rohingyas, hosts, and outsiders (e.g., NGO and other officials) were included in the study. Among the Rohingyas, both earlier and newly arrived Rohingyas (pre-2017 and 2017 onwards migrants, respectively) were included, while Bengalis, non-Bengalis (Chakma ethnic group), Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists were included from the local Bangladeshi host. Gender, age, occupation, and other categories were rationally maintained throughout the study.

Among the significant decisive findings, the causes of tension between the Rohingyas and the host community are substantial. The host community expressed their dissatisfaction over the exclusive humanitarian aid solely for the Rohingyas, reduced work facilities for the hosts, and the impact of influx on the environment and local culture. On the other hand, the Rohingyas were found to be dissatisfied with work facilities, access to education, and freedom of movement. However, they have been happy

with humanitarian aid and some other life-saving services. In addition to the Rohingya influx's direct impact on the changing relationship between Rohingyas and hosts, among the particularly significant issues are the location of their residence/shelter, level of interaction, the relationship between new and old Rohingyas, and the like. The study found that the hosts that already reside near/inside camps' boundaries are much more hostile against the Rohingya. On the other hand, those whose location is far from the camps are relatively less critical. Similarly, hosts in Ukhiya were found to be more aggressive or accusatory than in Teknaf. The interpersonal relationship and tolerance between the host of Teknaf and the Rohingya are relatively cohesive. Since ancient times, the socio-cultural proximity of Rohingyas in Teknaf has had a positive influence considerably.

Although for most Muslim Bengali hosts, the religious identity of the Rohingya has been a considered ground of sympathy or solidarity, bitterness has also been expressed among them due to the constant pressure and behaviour of the Rohingyas. The Muslim hosts have voiced frustration and regret over the Rohingya's "un-Islamic" behaviour and actions.

On the other hand, the attitude of non-Muslim hosts is relatively relaxed than that of Muslim hosts regarding the position and activities of Rohingyas. Regarding the conflicting relationship between Rohingyas and hosts, the hosts who have less contact with Rohingyas for work or any other reason seem to be more critical.

Among the hosts, attitudes towards the Rohingya are very similar between men and women under 40 in host communities. However, females over the age of 40 are more sympathetic than their counterparts toward the Rohingya issues, settlement, and humanitarian aid. Many female hosts view the spread of polygamy in host societies from the Rohingyas very severely. It has increased the number of inconsistencies in family relations in the host society, such as divorce, polygamy, and interethnic marriage (mainly between Rohingya females and Bengali males). To the Rohingyas, the CIC (Camp-in-Charge), Majhi, volunteers, and religious leaders of camps have a positive role to play in promoting social cohesion between Rohingyas and hosts, and the UNO (Upazila Nirbahi Officer), public representatives, and the

educated youth community will play a positive role in reaching out to the hosts. To both communities, 'terrorist' (e.g., Munna group, Salman group) groups are seen as a significant obstacle to peaceful coexistence, which they believe can be controlled by the military forces. According to many locals, some people's representatives, better-off hosts, landowners, and some NGOs do not want any significant change in the existing situation, Rohingya-host relationship or even Rohingya repatriation. In their opinion, it might jeopardize their interests, business, or ongoing programmes. They want the current situation to continue. News/social media could play a vital role in social cohesion. Negative information in the media also creates misunderstanding and resentment against the Rohingya settlement.

The study findings direct that both communities' inclusion in the humanitarian programmes, including support, will significantly reduce the host community's resentment. A variety of programmes can be undertaken for both communities, including skills development so that they have the opportunity to make a

reasonable living. It suggests that it is likely to promote social cohesion between Rohingya and the host community by mitigating existing tensions and conflicts through utilising mutual relations and local structures. If there is an indication from the top-level administration or the government for peaceful coexistence, correspondingly, everyone will have a positive attitude. And to promote that, necessary cooperation and work opportunities for Rohingyas and hosts must be created in both camps and host societies. Likewise, some substantial development activities (e.g., education, health, environment, road construction, and job opportunity) in Ukhiya and Teknaf will minimise the resentment of the hosts and inspire them toward social cohesion. Since the goal is yet to be finalised from the top-level, coordinated efforts from the below are needed in refugee management. Once the plan is set, all concerned bodies (e.g., individuals, institutions, communities) will best use skills and resources to build social cohesion between the once sympathetic but disputant communities.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Background

The forced migration-induced refugee situation is one of the most recent crises in the world. In late 2017 (August 25 toward), the global community has witnessed such a humanitarian crisis while the Rohingyas of Myanmar were forced to leave their home to take refuge in neighbouring Bangladesh to save their lives. At present (as of January 31, 2021), 871,924 Rohingyas (188,919 families) are living in 34 camps (including two registered camps) in Ukhiya and Teknaf Upazilas of Cox's Bazar district. More than 80 per cent of them fled the persecution of August 2017 in Myanmar's Rakhine State and took refuge in Bangladesh, while about 100,000 was born in the camps in the last three years (UNHCR, 2020). Consequently, the population of Rohingyas in Ukhiya and Teknaf has become almost double that of the local Bangladeshis. This demographic alteration indicates the current state of living conditions in Ukhiya and Teknaf. Under the circumstances, the primary concern of the protracted crisis is how to improve the existing relationship between the Rohingya and the host community (Anas, 2021).

Accordingly, this study intended to offer an insight into the potential and associated aspects of social cohesion between the Rohingyas, who

have been living in various camps arriving since the late 1970s, and the host community in Ukhiya and Teknaf. Generally, social cohesion is thought of as a post-conflict situation or when a refugee situation protracts. The second context is relevant to the current situation in Ukhiya and Teknaf. While social cohesion is not an existential state between Rohingyas and hosts, this study explored different aspects, routes, obstacles, and potentials toward this adventure. Given the fact that social cohesion is a successful outcome of several successive initiatives, to achieve this goal, it is essential to understand and follow the associated steps properly, such as the forms of tension, the causes, and mitigation strategies.

Given the complexity and challenges of hosting many Rohingyas in Cox's Bazar district and other development challenges and opportunities in Bangladesh, there is a need to explore better ways to support the needs of Rohingyas incorporating the host community in the medium term. Such discussions and plans must consider the views of both Rohingyas and hosts and ensure their participation. Considering the complexity of hosting the Rohingyas in Cox's Bazar for long, and its magnitude and the dynamics of Bangladesh's development challenges, it is imperative to take medium-term and

sustainable steps to accommodate the needs of the Rohingyas and host community. That is why it is necessary to look into possible windows of opportunities.

In this study, social cohesion is defined as a host of nature and relationships between individuals and groups in a specific environment (horizontal social cohesion)¹ and between those individuals and groups and organizations that operate them (vertical social cohesion). The indicators of a higher level of social cohesion are healthy, positive, and integrated relationships. In contrast, weak, cynical, or fragmented relationships are indicators of a lower level of social cohesion. Thus, social cohesion is a multi-faceted issue. To facilitate the social cohesion between the Rohingya and the host community, it is pertinent to focus on conflict and the pattern of coexistence. Towards that end, social cohesion and its determining factors such as trust, identity, equality, access to resources, and livelihoods were analysed relatedly.

¹ Horizontal social cohesion are also termed as Reconciliation in this study following the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) index introduced by SeeD and UNDP.

1.2 Context of the study

In late August 2017, the Myanmar military led a disproportionate and indiscriminate crackdown—a ‘clearance’ operation against the Rohingya minority in its Rakhine State. The ‘crimes against humanity’ has prompted an unprecedented exodus of more than 700,000 Rohingyas to Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh that was already hosting around 300,000 Rohingyas since the early 1980s (Sohel, 2017; Leider, 2018). The massive fresh influx has compounded the existing challenges and caused a major humanitarian crisis in the region. The emergency needs of the persecuted Rohingyas have been met with passionate support from the host community first, followed by the coordinated response from the government, NGOs, INGOs and the UN agencies. After three years of the recent persecution, the situation of Rohingyas has ‘stabilized’ (with shelter and food support) from a humanitarian perspective. However, they remain aid-dependent with a limited livelihood opportunity to become self-reliant, causing an overwhelming impact on host societies.

The massive scale and speed of the recent influx of Rohingya inevitably have had an economic, social, political, environmental, and security

impact on the host societies, where Rohingyas now outnumbered the hosts by a ratio of two to one. The dramatic surge in population has strained resources, infrastructure, and public services in the district, which were already fragile before the influx. It has created economic difficulties for the host community, including price hikes, inflation, labour competition, and market access difficulties. In addition to these, the swift expansion of the camps has resulted in rapid deforestation and degradation of forested land, contamination of local agricultural land and drinking water sources causing ecological problems and disturbing local communities and wildlife habitat (Xchange, 2018). Given both communities’ precarious situation coupled with insufficient or inaccurate information about the ‘other,’ tensions are steadily increasing amongst the two communities (Sunny, 2021). Besides, in a case where there are severe competition and a lack of opportunities to shape their futures and the future of their children and families, frustration and hopelessness reign and hatred gets momentum. Considering the context of Cox’s Bazar, social cohesion is indispensable not only for Rohingyas but also to ensure a peaceful life for the host community. Since the Rohingyas have been living in Ukhiya and Teknaf for decades,

there is no space to deny the protracted situation’s overwhelming impacts. It has to do with the active participation of both communities so that they become satisfied and their coexistence forms peacefully. To promote social cohesion among the communities, design and facilitate programming for quality engagement and peace building among them, operational analysis is required to understand better the nature and contributing factors to the tension and conflict. And to accomplish this, a framework needs to be formulated, which will be able to analyse changes like existing tensions and conflicts and inform mitigation strategies.

1.3 Objectives of the study

To promote social cohesion between the Rohingya and the host community, we needed to unveil the current relationship, conflicting issues, and new initiatives. Therefore, the central research question of this study was how could social cohesion be facilitated by motivating the prevailing relationships through peaceful coexistence between the two communities? To address this research question, the following objectives were focused on throughout the study .

- Peaceful coexistence between the two communities? To address this research question, the following objectives were focused on throughout the study.
- To map the nature and causes of the tension between Rohingya and host communities;
- To map the scope of engagements for social cohesion and peace-building considering the context, skills, interests and window of opportunities;
- To find out the champions and potential spoilers of social cohesion in Rohingya and host communities; and
- To design a framework that can analyse the change in conflict and also its mitigation strategy.

1.4 The methodology

By nature, the study was mainly an ethnographic study based primarily on qualitative data. Given that it is impossible to collect sufficient qualitative data due to time constraints, we assembled several quantitative data representatives to the camps and host societies employing a questionnaire survey. Although a mixed method of data collection was accomplished, the main focus was to collect qualitative data, which helped to understand conflict, dissatisfaction, tensions, and social cohesion between locals and migrants in a society, which was similarly observed elsewhere.

Keeping the research objective in line with the field perspective, the methodology was tailored to suit our broad goal towards yielding emic viewpoints (local perspectives) and the etic view on conflict and cohesion between the Rohingya and host communities. The following data gathering tools were properly employed throughout the study: (i) Observation; (ii) In-depth interview (IDI); (iii) Key informant interview (KII); and (iv) Focus group discussion (FGD); (v) Community timeline; and (vi) Questionnaire survey. Thus, the present research was conceived and designed basically as multi-instrument research.



Figure 1. Research methods of the study

1.5 Sampling Procedure

The qualitative sample population were selected by using standard purposive sampling procedures. This was an open procedure depending on the population's locality, composition, and interest in the study. This was a form of non-probability sampling in which decisions concerning the individuals included in the sample were taken by the researcher, based upon a variety of criteria which consists of specialist knowledge of the research issue or capacity and willingness to participate in the research. Some research design types necessitate researchers to decide the participants who

would be most likely to contribute appropriate data, both in relevance and depth (Oliver 2006). With the help of local organisations, participants for IDIs, KIs, and FGDs were selected based on the following criteria:

- Rohingya and host community (20-60 years) living at Ukhiya and Teknaf;
- Refugees who have fled from Rakhine before and after August 2017;
- Representative sample sizes (i.e., male-female) for each age group.

Quantitative samples were selected using two stages random sampling method. 12 Rohingya camps and six unions in Ukhiya and Teknaf Upazilas were chosen for the data collection area. The required sample size was calculated at 80% power, at 95% confidence interval, considering the proportion of cohesion to be 50%, design effect was considered as 2% and with 10% non-response rate Probability Proportion to Size (PPS) was used to decide the sample size in each camp and union. Considering the density of the population, interviews were conducted in the camps keeping the household intervals 5, and 3 in the host community.

Tools	No	Target Group	No. of Participants
Questionnaire survey	903	To quantify the people's perception about conflict and cohesion, a questionnaire survey has been administered among the Rohingya and host communities (both sexes).	903
Key Informant Interview (KII)	16	Community leaders (<i>Imam/Muajjin/teacher/civil society member, journalists, UP chairmen/members</i>)	4
		Camp leader (<i>Majhi, religious leader, teacher, youths from both new and old waves</i>)	4
		Women leader/activist (two from camps, two from hosts)	4
		Officials (Govt. & aid agency)	4
In-depth Interview (IDI)	45	Adult junior: 15-25 years (both male and female)	10
		Adult (senior: 25-50 years) (both male and female)	25
		Elderly (50 years and above) (both male and female)	10
Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	18	Male group (elderly, volunteers, youth, adolescent, professional groups, community leaders)	10
		Female group (elderly, volunteers, youth, adolescent, professional groups, community leaders)	8

Table 1. Distribution of participants

1.6 Ethical Considerations

Throughout the study, necessary ethical considerations were emphasised during targeted training to those involved in data collection, FGDs, in-depth interviews and throughout the data collection process. All data collectors received sufficient training on issue-sensitization and gender/child-friendly interview techniques. Special care was taken to ensure that the individuals who participated in the interviews would not be exposed to additional risks while providing sensitive subjects. Finally, participants' confidentiality and anonymity were ensured by gathering all information in private and not using names or attributing responses to specific individuals who participated in the interviews and discussions. The study team also maintained Covid-19 protocols properly.

1.7 Quality Assurance

The following quality control standards and criteria were implemented during the study:

- All study tools were tested before finalising them for use in the main research phase.

- Only team members who received relevant training on data collection, GBV and child protection, and the ethical considerations related to this research were involved in the study.
- In order to ensure the accuracy of the information, all IDIs, KIs, and FGDs were recorded both electronically and by hand, with permission from the participants.
- The use of best practices and the attainment of research objectives were also confirmed.

1.8 Limitations of the Study

The study was conducted with a small number of people by using IDIs, KIs and FGDs that might have not represented the entire communities living in different camps and host societies in Ukhiya and Teknaf Upazilas of Cox's Bazar district. Due to permission related complications in researching Rohingya camps, we had to slow the study amid the Covid-19 situation.

1.9 Contribution of the Study

The study aims to contribute to the evidence-based network by allowing the Rohingya and host communities to anonymously express their opinions and feelings about issues related to social cohesion. As the duration of the stay of Rohingyas protracts in Cox's Bazar, the trends in these perceptions and shifting relationships have profound implications. The report is essential, as it builds upon the existing empirical data to determine if and how the ongoing social and economic shifts have affected perceptions of the Rohingyas and host community.

CHAPTER 2

Impact of the influx and issues of conflict

2.1 Impact of the Influx

Many scholars have studied the relationship between refugees and host communities. Among them, Robert Chambers (1986) revealed multifaceted aspects of the refugee-host relationship. He presented how refugee camps affect host communities in particular situations and circumstances, which is now more relevant than ever before. According to him, consumption-dissatisfaction or competition surrounding these natural resources is usually created in limited access to natural resources.

Along with providing shelter to the refugees, their safety and peaceful living in host societies have become a big challenge, especially when the refugee situation protracts. Exclusively support and humanitarian aid for the refugees and the negative impact of refugee camps on hosting societies deteriorated the

mutual relationship, which led to further problems, as found in the case of the Kakuma host community of Kenya (Chambers 1986). Later, Garcia and Saah (2009) also found comparable findings. While examining the impact of refugees and refugee programmes on the poor hosts, Chambers notably identified the impacts of refugee situations on different groups among the host community. He argued that in refugee-affected areas, usually wealthy and middle-class hosts, who have business/trades, benefit from the presence of refugees and refugee programs. On the other hand, most of the hosts, who are usually poor, suffer in various ways from the competition for food, work, wages, services, and common property and resources. Both of these realities are relevant in the case of Rohingya settlement in Ukhiya and Teknaf. Thus, as mentioned above, the impact of any refugee situation was found mixed both positive and negative. The effect varies

due to the number of refugees, the duration of the refugee situation, the ongoing relationship with the hosts, the pressure of the influx on local livelihoods, etc. Sometimes, despite having a positive impact, it is suppressed due to public perceptions and negative attitudes. In many cases, only the negative impact becomes the prominent one. We have observed these dynamics in the Rohingya situation.

The Rohingyas have been living in Bangladesh for almost four decades (Ahmed, 2020). The impact of such a large population over a long time is far-reaching that needs to be analysed with a holistic analytical tool. These effects are mixed and depend on the Rohingya's residence, the local community's area, the education, age group, and working status of both communities, the Rohingya-host relationship, how long they have lived, and how far or near they live.




Figure 2. Impact of refugee settlements on host societies

Compared to previous years, the post-2017 situation created a new set of relationships between Rohingyas and hosts in Ukhiya and Teknaf. The establishment of large settlements resulted in a radical change throughout the region. At the same time, the host community turned into a minority in their locality, bringing challenges for the most while opportunities for the few (Anas, 2021) As we found, most of the hosts expressed their positive gestures for the Rohingyas during the latter's arrival in 2017. But at the same time, they are aggrieved that they have not been included in refugee management or humanitarian assistance programmes. Below we will understand how the host community sees the influx of the Rohingyas in their societies.

As we understand the overwhelming impact of the influx on locals' lives, we tried to get their views as essential for tackling social cohesion. Wide-ranging but mixed effects of influx were noticed in their response. The locals identified several fields of impact on their lives (Table 2). Among them, traffic jams (98%, which was rare in the past) and price hikes (98%) of daily essentials are the most adverse ones. They also ranked crimes (85%) as a significant concern. Moreover, about 60% of hosts did not consider their region any longer safe due to the overwhelming presence of the Rohingyas. Many (about 40%) mentioned difficulties in getting jobs. Moreover, they find it challenging to find work in the daily local labour market. In the changed situation, 37% of the hosts have had to work for low

wages. About 15% of host participants reported that they lost their jobs after the 2017 influx. However, about 18% of hosts said they had access to new jobs after the influx, and 9% expanded their business. About 15% of hosts said the arrival of Rohingyas ruined their business. 15% of host respondents claimed that Rohingyas disrupted the overall educational environment. Besides, about 11% of locals reported that they lost their occupied land (Khas/government-owned) due to their arrival and setting up camps, where they used to farm. would not only raise conflict between them, but the stateless Rohingyas would also try to get Bangladeshi citizenship (67 %) by any means.

Consequences (hosts' views)	%
Conflict with locals	24.47
Demographic imbalance against hostAccident rate increased	28.16
Socio-cultural deterioration	30.26
Food crisis	35.00
Land grabbed	36.58
Decreased opportunities/services	38.68
Environmental disaster	46.58
Increased drug addiction	55.26
Disruption in normal life	62.11
Increased criminal tendencies	68.42
Decreased livelihood opportunities	78.95
Price hike	91.32

*Multiple responses allowed

Table 2. Negative Impact of Sheltering Rohingya on the host community

As we realise that the Rohingyas will stay in Bangladesh for some more years, we need to know the attitude of the Rohingyas and hosts living in Ukhiya and Teknaf about social cohesion. The way the Rohingyas have

been sheltered in Cox's Bazar since the 1980s, and given that there is no immediate prospect of returning to the Rakhine state of Myanmar, local Bangladeshis have a relatively negative perception of the Rohingya's whereabouts (Table 3). We see

that 82% of hosts considered that Rohingyas' longer stay would not only raise conflict between them, but the stateless Rohingyas would also try to get Bangladeshi citizenship (67 %) by any means.

Long-term effects	%
Conflicts with the locals will emerge	82.38
Problems among the Rohingya and the locals will increase	76.67
Rohingyas might want Bangladeshi citizenship	66.90
Economic problems will occur in this area	60.95
Rohingyas might want independence	58.10
The Rohingyas will get mixed in the local society	52.14
Rise of fanaticism	42.86

*Multiple responses allowed

Table 3. Local perception on Rohingyas' protracted stay

Rohingyas also thought that even if they wanted to return to their country, there was no way to return anytime soon; so, they had to stay in Bangladesh

for a long time. With this in mind, Rohingyas expressed a different perception of their protracted refugeehood (Table 4). They also felt that under the

current situation, conflict with locals would continue to grow (53 %), and some Rohingyas would be integrated into local society (34%).

Long-term effects	%
Conflicts with the locals will emerge	53.00
Problems among the Rohingya and the locals will increase	52.80
The Rohingyas will get mixed in the local society	34.37
Economic problems will occur in this area	33.54
Bangladeshi citizenship needs to be provided for us	26.50
This area will prosper economically	16.56
Rohingyas might want independence	10.97

*Multiple responses allowed

Table 4. Rohingya perception of their protracted stay

2.2 Humanitarian Aid

Humanitarian aid has had the most significant impact on the Rohingya-host relationship. Rohingyas get all the help they need for their livelihood. They sell surplus goods at low prices in the market. As a result, local people get the opportunity to buy some goods at low prices on the one hand; on the other hand, it has negatively impacted local markets. However, the worst image of aid can be seen in the minds of the hosts. They expressed that NGOs are feeding one million Rohingyas, however, those who are in danger now due to the Rohingyas' arrival do not get any importance to the NGOs: "Rohingyas get local and foreign foods without any work, and we are struggling to survive on our own."

Since the arrival of Rohingyas in Bangladesh, the host community and the government authorities have provided shelter and lifesaving services immediately. Several humanitarian organisations (about 139)² have also been providing lifesaving services to the Rohingyas—both the newly arrived (2017 onward) and the older waves. As a result of that, Rohingyas are living in camps depending mainly on humanitarian aid. As they receive almost everything they need for survival, they do not need to manage their livelihoods independently. Work permit or

income-generating activity (in terms of cash) is not also allowed.

Most of the host community discussions hinted at their resentment at a common point of view: the Rohingya refugees receive all kinds of assistance for their livelihood. Not only are they getting essential foods without any work, but they also get bread, biscuits, nutritious foods, clothing, and other daily necessities. They usually sell their surplus items in local markets/relief markets, and they try to make a usual living with the money. Some of them use mobiles and the internet, which is not possible for many poor hosts.

In general, the study findings suggest that the host community is bothered by international aid agencies. As a result, their attitudes against the Rohingyas have been exposed in many ways. Hosts consider the aid to the Rohingyas as an injustice, as humanitarian agencies do not consider the needs of the poor hosts. Although these are humanitarian aid, it is an "inhuman attitude and discrimination" to most hosts. Hosts, especially low-income Bengali and non-Bengali ethnic hosts (such as Chakmas in Teknaf), have repeatedly mentioned this aid "inequality". Thus, complete relief to the Rohingyas and the protracted refugeehood aggrieved the hosts, resulting in tensions. Some host

participants, especially women, also considered that Rohingyas are victims of the situation; they need supports.

In addition to humanitarian aid, Rohingyas receive a wide range of support from various organisations, which most hosts usually do not avail. This creates apparent social and economic discrepancies between Rohingyas and hosts, leading to conflicts between them, contrary to the purpose of the refugee settlement—where refugees' shelters become unsafe, and their relationship with the hosts deteriorates; in some cases, their relationship with the hosts deteriorates cases, becomes hostile. international aid agencies. As a result, their attitudes against the Rohingyas have been exposed in many ways. Hosts consider the aid to the Rohingyas as an injustice, as humanitarian agencies do not consider the needs of the poor hosts. Although these are humanitarian aid, it is an "inhuman attitude and discrimination" to most hosts. Hosts, especially low-income Bengali and non-Bengali ethnic hosts (such as Chakmas in Teknaf), have repeatedly mentioned this aid "inequality". Thus, complete relief to the Rohingyas and the protracted refugeehood

² <https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/bangladesh-with-drew-41-ngos-from-rohingya-camps-for-malpractices>

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2.3 Work

Work facilities are one of the significant domains of the impact caused by the influx and bases of conflict between the Rohingyas and hosts. Locals feel that as an immediate impact of influx, they have lost work opportunities and lands, which in turn sowed the seeds of conflict between them. Although the price of daily essentials has gone up since the arrival of the Rohingyas, wages have gone down. Some hosts now do not have enough work facilities because the better-off hosts usually hire Rohingya labourers as they are relatively cheap labour. While local labourers charge BDT 500-600 per day, Rohingyas work for BDT 200-300. In an FGD, some hosts claimed that they hire not only because of cheaper wages but also to help the destitute Rohingyas. In addition, "they work harder than the locals," claimed some host work providers. According to a local representative in Ukhiya, job opportunities and works for the hosts decreased because Rohingyas took jobs or worked

significantly lower wages. Likewise, an NGO official stated that the influx seriously damages poor hosts; especially, farmers who do not have the opportunity to work now. In the past, most of the CNG/Tomtom drivers were local, but now Rohingyas are increasingly getting involved in these works. As a result, some of the locals are losing their jobs. Due to the establishment of camps, those hosts who used to grow vegetables and cultivate paddy in Khas lands have lost that opportunity and have become workless (e.g., Piyokpara). Although they are not the owner of those lands, they occupied and used them for a long. Some other hosts in Teknaf said, "We used to grow crops in the Khas lands, but now Rohingyas live there." As found in our quantitative study, host respondents who opined the negative impact of influx, 78.68% of them reported the reduction of livelihood/job opportunities and 36.58 mentioned land grabbing after the influx.

After the influx, some young and educated locals got jobs in camps in different NGOs. Still, locals said, they got less opportunity compared to people from other districts. So, they felt deprived not only because of the Rohingyas but also non-Rohingya Bangladeshis from other districts. Many locals came to work in NGOs following the influx (KRC, Tulatoli, Lambasia). “The NGOs give jobs mainly to people of other districts. Good jobs are reserved for them. Local people get less salaried jobs.” However, according to some NGO officials, most host applicants are not qualified enough to avail higher positions.

Although work facilities are restricted for the Rohingyas, many are involved in various activities (such as construction works) inside camps. Influx's pressure on job opportunities or benefits applies to Rohingyas already living there for long—the old Rohingyas. As stated by some old Rohingyas, before the 2017 influx, they had the opportunity to work around eight months in a year. But now, most of the time, they have no work. Still, some Rohingyas manage works outside their camps.

Besides the Rohingyas, host community people also face various forms of obstacles, particularly those living inside

the camp area for a long time. Freedom of movement is one of them. Since late 2017, they have faced problems in movement from camps to outsides for various purposes. According to hosts living inside the camp (such as in 1E), earlier they used to go outside for work like Ukhiya, Court Bazar. But now, this opportunity has been restricted. As they said, they cannot go outside of camps for agricultural purposes. Their children face obstacles to attending schools outside the camp due to movement restrictions to and from camps to outsides.

Domains	Impact on host societies	Causes of conflict between host and Rohingya: views of respondents	
		Host	Rohingya
Population	Rohingyas become more than double of the hosts	Locals feel they have become the minority in their lands.	Rohingya think they are confined within a few kilometres with a vast population, which is like an "open prison" to them.
Aid	Prices of some items (soap, oil, etc.) reduced, making the local market unstable	Rohingyas receive humanitarian aid, but hosts have largely been excluded.	The Rohingya think they are displaced and helpless, so they deserve humanitarian aid.
Works	Work opportunities of poor hosts reduced (mainly of day labourers).	Locals think they have lost work facilities because of the Rohingyas that offer labour at a cheaper wage.	According to the Rohingyas, they are not allowed to work. While they work informally, they get relatively low wages and are often cheated.
Economy	Prices of daily essentials, house rent, and transport fares increased	Local small business owners and the general people feel that the economic situation has suffered due to the Rohingya's presence	The way the Rohingyas are spending their days here, they never imagined. Their economic situation in Arakan was much better.
Education	Local students and teachers lost interest in education as they got the job in NGOs	With the arrival of Rohingyas, the overall education sector was disrupted. The locals fear that this area will lag in education in future.	Year after year, Rohingyas are still deprived of educational opportunities, leading their children toward a 'lost generation'
Environment	Hills, forests and other natural resources have been destroyed indiscriminately. The social environment has become unhealthy.	Landslides and floods will be more frequent here as a result of cutting down hills and trees. The water has already gone much more profound. Excessive human habitation will result in a shortage of essential oxygen. Healthy development will be disrupted.	The Rohingyas think that the environment in which they live is not desirable for human beings.
Security	Rohingyas' presence is overwhelming. Moreover, they are involved in quarrels among themselves, even with hosts.	Locals think the whole security system is busy with managing the law-and-order situation in the camp areas.	The lives of Rohingyas in fragile and overpopulated camps are always full of panic and anxiety.
Health	The vast population pressure and Rohingya lifeways in camps are a health risk to the host society.	The hosts believe that any health disaster (such as AIDS) due to Rohingyas could happen in Ukhiya-Teknaf at any time.	Rohingyas do not get proper treatment and necessary medicine in health centres. The health staff often misbehave with them.
Culture	Local society, culture and values have been undermined today by the omnipresence and activities of the migrants-- people of another ethnic group.	Traditional culture, customs, and values are under threat. Family relationships are slowly weakening.	Living with parents and children in confined camps and tiny rooms is inhumane. Rohingya's culture is under threat due to the NGO culture. Their family ties have become fragile as well.

2.4 Economy

The influx has both positive and negative effects on the local economy. Participants from the host community stated the overwhelming impact on their economic activities. As they said, prices of essential commodities also increased. Three years ago, the prices of vegetables and fish were affordable there. But, with the arrival of Rohingyas, the prices of all daily necessities went up. "We never faced poverty before 2017. But now we have to think twice before buying any basic commodity due to price hike" (Lambashia, Ukhiya). The price hike was identified as a major impact by 98% of respondents. On the other hand, work opportunities such as daily labour, vegetable farming, and other agricultural activities decreased.

We got some different information from several hosts. According to a teacher (in Goyalmara, Ukhiya), the local economy has also benefited in some ways due to the influx and NGOs' response. An NGO official also added that some wealthy and middle-income families benefited financially through their transport business and house-rent due to the influx. As stated by some youth hosts in Ukhiya, their income has increased following the

2017 influx. They also mentioned that some host communities became well-off over time, employed Rohingyas in their business, and rented their lands (Lambasia and Balkhali in Ukhiya and Camp 25 in Teknaf). Over time, better-off hosts increased the number of CNGs and Tomtom, while most drivers are Rohingyas since they are accessible at lower salaries. The NGOs are assisting the Rohingyas; they have recently started helping poor host communities. But the middle-income people do not receive any assistance from any quarter, even though some of them are in need due to the influx and Covid-19 situation. However, some local young people and day labourers became frustrated over time, losing their works and business.

2.5 Education

In our qualitative study, most host communities reported that due to the 2017 influx, the overall education environment had been disrupted. Their children's education had been severely affected, especially when those inside the camps faced abuse and were even hurt on the way to their schools situated outside of camps. Due to the establishment of camps,

their playgrounds got reduced and unsafe. Earlier, the children and youth used to study in schools and colleges. But after the influx, the NGOs made the situation worse by providing jobs to class nine/ten students and college students.

After the arrival of Rohingyas, NGOs provided a lot of part-time works to local students, which resulted in many school dropouts as the students joined NGOs. The locals said, the impact was not limited to school or colleges, but also society and family life (Goyalmara, Ukhiya). The number of school-college going students reduced drastically. Later, those students neither continued their jobs nor education. Eventually, some of them got linked to various criminal activities (Shamlapur, Teknaf). Several teachers also resigned from their positions and joined NGOs. Thus, the education scenario in host societies has been affected, while the Rohingya children have no access to formal education. As a result, dissatisfaction prevails among the locals over the arrival and sheltering of Rohingyas. "They have not just tainted our present, they have disrupted our future. We are just watching out

fate helplessly" (a female school teacher in Ukhiya). In our questionnaire surveys, 15% of respondents clearly blamed that their children's education got hampered due to the recent influx. Rohingyas also expressed their dissatisfaction over the exclusion in education. They claimed that they had been deprived of formal/recognised education after living in the country for decades, with the inevitable consequence being the 'lost generation'.

2.6 Environment

In host societies, we found locals' resentment over the protracted refugee situation in their localities: "Our village has been overpopulated in the last three years". In effect, the host community people feel the "burden" in every sphere of their lives. Along with the qualitative study, in our survey, about 98% of respondents identified traffic jams as a common troublesome concern in the region. Before influx, there was no jam whatsoever; now, they must leave home one hour before going somewhere, particularly in Ukhiya. Roads are no longer safe. Accident rates have also increased. Nevertheless, the transport

system has been developed over the years. Deforestation and hills cutting are among the environmental destruction caused by the influx in Ukhiya and Teknaf. Some hosts in Kutupalong said that agricultural lands and forests had been destroyed due to the influx. As stated by an elderly host, "Due to the influx, not only the forests, our mango trees, and berry trees have been destroyed as we have lost our lands." Even the rearing of cows, goats, and poultry has declined due to the loss of cultivable lands and security issues. "Rohingyas have come to our village, cut the trees and pick up the leaves; eventually, we face problems with cooking". As stated by some other hosts, "They took away our works, lives, and environment."

Some female hosts in FGDs said, "Rohingyas live around us, so we are now living like prisoners. They have destroyed our entire environment". In KILs, teachers and elderly hosts warned that if Rohingyas' arrival continues, locals will face acute problems lacking oxygen and food. One NGO official also stated that "Even now, hosts do not have enough space to gossip or refreshment in their locality or Bazar." Some hosts echoed, "Rohingya population has increased a lot in the region. That is why today, we

have to compete with ourselves and the Rohingyas for their livelihood and work. No one knows where and whether it will end."

Most of the host participants linked the Yaba drug issue with the Rohingya problem. Their discussions highlighted that Yaba tablets were previously prevalent in Ukhiya and Teknaf but have increased dramatically since the 2017 influx, as many Rohingyas are involved with Yaba trafficking. Since the Yaba tablet comes from Myanmar, Rohingyas are much more associated with it. They had been engaged before as well. As a result, according to some local people, the local youth community is on the verge of destruction. Many have already lost their lives in the crossfire for their involvement with this drug trade. Today, life has become uncertain; every family is worried. Mentally, all (more than 80%) are in fear- because of the Rohingyas and Yaba panic.

2.7 Health service

Some locals received relatively better health care after the Rohingya influx, which was previously almost unimaginable. However, most hosts have reported a kind of panic concerning health. According to them, although there is no visible health risk, Rohingyas's

inevitable impact on local livelihood and the environment has resulted in health risks at any time. The way Rohingyas maintain their life, some locals said, if any infectious disease starts there for any reason, it will spread rapidly among the locals: “Even if nothing happens to the Rohingyas, the locals’ lives will be endangered”. Such panic has been noticed amid the Covid-19 pandemic. Such fearful situations increased the distance and tension between Rohingyas and hosts, detrimental to peaceful coexistence and social cohesion.

Although the access to healthcare in the region has been improved due to the influx, Rohingyas claimed, they do not get proper services in most health centres except a few health centres. They are not well tested or checked well but are usually given some common drugs (such as paracetamol) for almost any disease. Many staff misbehave with them for the linguistic gap. However, they have no dispute with the locals in this matter.

2.8 Freedom of Movement

Freedom of movement has been one of the major concerns for both Rohingyas and hosts. Although Rohingyas have been living in Ukhiya and Teknaf since

the 1990s, and there were government restrictions on their movement, they were relatively free. The freedom of movement has been highly restricted after the 2017 influx.

We found different information regarding the relationship among the Rohingyas (between the old and new Rohingyas). The old Rohingyas claimed that due to the recent influx, they lost their freedom of movement. Now they are not allowed to go outside of the camps. On the other hand, the new Rohingyas stated that the old Rohingyas tortured them. The new Rohingyas call the old Rohingyas Waishya (needy/starved)—who arrived before the 2017 influx (3-10 years before) but did not receive aid from humanitarian organisations. As stated by an old Rohingya living in Ukhiya (FGD in KRC), “There has been no security in the camp since the influx of 2017. We could go anywhere before the new influx. But now we are confined.”

The new Rohingyas also opined that they do not feel comfortable and safe in camps as old Rohingyas want to dominate them (Camp 1E). Some Rohingyas (from Camp 4) also said they find the camps relatively safe. They can work both inside and outside their camps. They, however stated that unemployment and idleness led some Rohingya youths to be involved with criminal activities. A Majhi

commented in this regard, “We are getting involved in criminal activities due to unemployment. And we lost our mental stability. We cannot find any way to live.”

2.9 Security

Although the effects of influx are observed in many areas of life (work, income, economy, and environment), for the locals, the security of their lives is an area that the Rohingyas have severely disrupted. As stated by some locals, the effects of influx are so devastating that locals no longer feel their neighbourhood is safe. The host community and the old Rohingyas think that the new Rohingyas have severely damaged the overall environment of Cox’s Bazar, particularly in Ukhiya and Teknaf, putting their lives at risk.

As stated by some hosts, with the arrival of Rohingyas, the locals have become helpless. They expressed extreme insecurity. To them, “We have become outsiders in our own country.” Due to the Rohingya situation, many check posts have been set up on the Cox’s Bazar-Ukhiya-Teknaf roads where everyone has to show their national identification (NID) cards and explain why their movement. Thus, the people have to go through a security check today. Some hosts mentioned, sometimes Rohingyas get permission, but

locals are stopped and interrogated for a long time. They also blamed Rohingyas can leave the camp by bribing the security forces. They can come and go outside the camp at any time. That is why the locals are constantly in fear. Since the Rohingyas can roam all over the region, local people do not feel comfortable in their territory. They are often in tension about when, where and what happens.

Rohingyas are concerned about the safety of their girls and women as some incidents of rapes took place inside the camps—committed by hosts, security forces and even by Rohingya fellows. According to some Rohingya women (KRC, Ukhiya), an old Rohingya woman was gang-raped by a group of new Rohingyas in 2020. On the other hand, a Rohingya school teacher in NRC (Teknaf) informed that once, a Rohingya girl was raped by a member of the army. Since then, activities of the army with regards to security in NRC have been reduced. Moreover, Rohingya girls inside the overpopulated and fragile camps are always intimidated by the lack of security. The same situation can be noticed among the hosts. In Teknaf, they are particularly concerned about the safety of their girls

and women due to some incidents, including the rape of local women by Rohingya men. The research team got information about such an incident (rape committed by a Rohingya) from the female participants in Ratnapalong, Ukhiya. Moreover, many locals informed, Rohingyas are involved in activities such as stealing, ransacking and kidnapping. Now the hosts do not feel safe sending their daughters to schools/colleges. Because since the arrival of the Rohingyas, there are now many people living in the area, most of whom are strangers, and their movements and behaviour are suspicious to the hosts. As the survey depicts, 85% of host respondents believe that crime in the region has increased after the influx.

The drug, Yaba, is deeply entangled with the overall security and environment of Ukhiya and Teknaf. Locals believe that Rohingyas or unemployed hosts, mainly, youths are involved in peddling drugs. According to them, some security personnel (e.g., police, BGB (Border Guard Bangladesh), journalists, and politicians have vested interests in the trade. Likewise, some key informants (teachers, NGO officials, journalists) said the local administration is also indirectly involved in the drug

business. As they stated, local administrations regularly take bribes from drug dealers. Rohingyas can go outside of camps bribing police or BGB.

Apart from the direct or indirect impact of influx, the growing population of Rohingyas is considered by some locals as a particular concern for the region's future. As stated by some, the Rohingyas sometimes claim that Ukhiya-Teknaf-Cox's Bazar is their ancestral territory. They are constantly involved in conflict with each other and organised into various terrorist groups inside the camps. Some locals also signalled, "As their population is growing, if they ever try to oust us, they will be able to do it as they are very violent and have nothing to lose, with no setback for them." They also said that some Rohingyas recently kidnapped two Bengali drivers and took them inside a camp. In Lambasia and Alukhali, Teknaf, some hosts said they lived happily in peace in their area. Now they do not sleep peacefully. They cannot sleep at night as they hear gunshots all around. They mainly are terrified of the safety of their female family members. Now that they have become a minority, they live with this fear when the Rohingyas chase them from their homes: "We live like a minority or outsiders in our own country".

Similarly, an elderly in Ukhiya stated, “The Rohingya people are very ferocious. Even in day time, they come to kill our people.” A Bengali who used to help the Rohingyas before the NGOs came was killed by the Rohingyas. In agreement with some terrorist Rohingyas, now some locals are also involved in various crimes as locals and Rohingyas said, some Rohingya-Bengali groups in around camps 24 and 25 in Teknaf. They carry out terrorist activities together. As a result, Rohingya-Bengali people commit crimes (e.g., kidnapping, ransacking, killing, drug trafficking, etc.) together for the sake of their interests, which has created a risky situation for the whole region. Locals are occasionally (Akter, 2020) protesting, but many believe the crime rate is not declining, instead rising. After a few days, Rohingyas have been caught in Cox's Bazar or Chittagong with arms, Yaba drug, or fake money by the law enforcement agencies (Siddiqua, 2020).

It is widely alleged that many Rohingyas have already made fake NID cards with the help of local brokers, and many have obtained Bangladeshi

passports. The hosts, including a local chairman, said that Rohingyas had made passports from different parts of the country in exchange for money. The money is given to the local brokers from BDT 50,000 to one lakh⁴, and they manage everything. Earlier, they used their permanent residence address in Ukhiya or Teknaf on NID cards, but now it has become challenging to do so, now most of the NID cards are using addresses of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Some Rohingyas are also staying in Rangamati, Bandarban, or Khagrachhari. However, most are still live in the camps, although their NID card addresses are in the hill districts of CHT. The local chairman said they keep it a secret. Consequently, Rohingyas will create new problems not only for Ukhiya or Teknaf but also for sensitive areas like the CHT. In discussing the relationship of Rohingyas with the locals on the reasons for the existing relationship, Rohingyas have time and again emphasised their living conditions in the camps (Table 6) and some other issues about how the locals see them (Table 7). As Table 6 depicts, they are satisfied with

the humanitarian aid agencies, while more than 50% said aid is still insufficient. However, according to more than 70% of Rohingya respondents, their living conditions in camps are good. Regarding Rohingya local people's attitude, most of the Rohingyas (83%) claimed that the hosts have abused them. They also mentioned some negative attitudes of the hosts toward them. These issues need to be addressed to improve the Rohingya-host relationship and maintain peaceful coexistence between them.

⁴ <https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/syndicate-helps-rohingyas-get-nid-passports-1796749t>

Views on camp life	%
The living condition in camp is good	71.64%
Humanitarian aid agencies behave well	93.58%
Humanitarian aid agencies provide relief regularly	94.83%
Humanitarian aid agencies never take opinions while providing aid	55.70%
Humanitarian relief is insufficient	54.15%
Never sold relief items for cash	55.90%
Never engage in risky work for cash	83.65%
Often borrowed money to fulfil family needs	55.49%
Never happens crime in the camp	75.15%
Never feel unsafe	76.40%
Feel humanitarian aid will decline in the next months	45.76%

*Multiple responses allowed

Table 6. Rohingya perception about camp life*

Rohingyas' views	%
The locals verbally abuse me	83.08
The locals consider me their enemy	47.69
The locals consider me lower	40.00
The locals don't give money after work/ give less amount	26.15
The locals do not give me work	20.00
Others	24.62

*Multiple responses allowed

Table 7. Rohingya perception about local's attitude*

2.10 Culture and Custom

In terms of traditional culture and custom, both communities expressed their discontent. According to most locals, their traditional socio-cultural lifeways is getting weaker after the influx (Rohingya, NGOs). Similarly, Rohingyas feel that their culture is under threat because of many issues that contradict their traditional way of life such as NGOs activities, women's works, and mobility.

According to many hosts, Bangladeshis had no preparation or foresight in the Rohingya shelter. There was no information or perception on how many Rohingyas would come, where they would be accommodated or how their daily needs would be met. As a result, the pressure of the sudden influx has reached in and devastated the whole region. As stated by some elderly hosts living in the Lambasia area of Ukhiya, "We are imprudent, without thinking about the environment, we have given shelter to the Rohingyas to build houses by cutting down hills and trees".

As most hosts mentioned, Rohingyas have created a negative perception of the host societies in the neighbouring areas. Now people from neighbouring Upazilas and districts do not want to marry girls from Ukhiya or Teknaf. They call the people of Ukhiya-Teknaf, 'Rohingya.'

Thus, to the hosts, their society's overall environment (e.g., security, culture, and movement) has deteriorated due to the protracted Rohingya situation.

Apart from the social environment, host communities, especially the males with a strong patriarchal mindset, also emphasised the impact on their traditional lifeways. According to the male respondents, now many females are doing jobs in NGOs. As they earn money and are influenced by NGOs, they do not listen to their husbands and families. The locals opined that the working women quarrel with their husbands, and in effect, the divorce rate has increased recently. On the other hand, some female hosts blamed that as a result of Rohingyas' arrival, polygamy has spread in the host societies. Some married Bengalis get married to Rohingya girls. There are some forms of interethnic marriage between the Rohingya female and host men (about 6% from both communities as stated in the surveys).

Besides the changed relationship in family life, hosts also mentioned the influence of NGOs and foreign women as a negative impression, "Females from other districts and abroad walk around the villages and camps wearing jeans and shirts". Apart from the clothes, locals are unhappy because of the movement and western appearance among the NGO

workers. Some of them (one female member and a teacher) said in this regard, "Our traditional culture is being destroyed."

The impact of the Rohingya influx on language and communication can also be seen in the local lives. As the locals feel, the language of the area's people (especially the youth and students) is getting corrupt because of the Rohingyas. The language and culture of the Rohingyas are not like the local language and culture. "They use many slang words in their conversation. That is why locals do not like to associate with Rohingyas," said an NGO official at Lambashiya.

However, some hosts in Ukhiya opined that as a result of Rohingya settlement in the Ukhiya-Teknaf region, people from other districts and abroad have come to this area. Earlier, the local people of this coastal region could not communicate well with outsiders. But now they know how to talk with non-Chittagonian people and foreigners.

CHAPTER 3

Dynamics of Relationship

3.1 Inter-community relationship between Rohingya and hosts

At the beginning of Rohingyas' arrival, the relationship between Rohingya and host communities was cordial— the host community was compassionate and supported Rohingya's arrival, and stayed in all possible ways in Ukhiya and Teknaf. However, gradually it became unfriendly, and to an extent, hostile -- particularly since mid-2018. Similar to the qualitative findings, the quantitative surveys found that, in 2017, about 59% of the respondents supported offering shelter to the Rohingyas, in December 2020, it decreased to as low as 9%. On the other hand, according to Rohingya participants, at the time of their arrival (2017/2018), most of the locals welcomed them (98%), while the rate of old Rohingyas was 89%. That is, according to them, the locals made their arrival very affectionate in the beginning. Gradually, however, the picture began to change primarily from mid-2018— "both locals and old Rohingyas are not behaving like before".

In terms of relationships, we found a relative perspective from the Rohingyas and hosts based on their locations, positions, and interactions. For example, the hosts that already have lived inside camp areas are more aggrieved than those who live far from the camps.

They have lost their occupied land and are having trouble communicating with others because of the camp establishment. Rohingyas are getting various kinds of aid in front of their eyes. As a result, those hosts have become much more critical of shelter and annoyed with Rohingyas. However, some Rohingyas said that in the beginning, some hosts also made Rohingya/refugee cards and received aid; they were happy then. But after the Rohingyas' list was finalised, many are now very jealous of Rohingyas as they no longer manage cards or aid. We also found a different picture between the host community and Rohingyas in Teknaf, which is relatively easy-going than in Ukhiya. One of the reasons for this is that the hosts and Rohingyas have been living in Teknaf for a long time, and the population imbalance that began in late 2017 has happened mainly in Ukhiya. Before the 2017 influx, the relationship of Rohingyas with the locals was relatively good. Wherever it is good, there is the interaction between the Rohingyas and the locals; intermarriage (see, Uddin 2021a), travel and participation in religious ceremonies. Their children would play together. However, both communities believe that this picture has declined.

However, the overall mutual relationship can be measured

by the impact, stress, and problems. To the hosts in Ukhiya, Rohingyas are burdened as the latter hinder their simple ways of life. Now the hosts cannot go outside camps to attend schools, farm, or work outside like before. Likewise, an elderly man (in Lambasia, Kutupalong) said, "In the beginning, we sheltered them as a Muslim and human being. We did not think about our problems or scarcity of resources. But now we face various problems caused by them."

According to some hosts, Rohingyas are a burden to the region, but they are also a cause of fear. A host in his 50s said in this regard, "They (Rohingya) can do anything for money. They are now hired for committing crimes. They recently killed our UP chairman at a tea stall" (Kutupalong, Ukhiya). However, some women in host communities were found still favourable to old Rohingyas (pre-2017 waves): "We have a good relationship with old Rohingyas because they are a good human beings. But the new Rohingyas (August 2017 onward) are not that good like the earlier ones", stated by a female host in her 50s. A younger female host also said that, in the beginning, hosts helped the Rohingyas because they thought Rohingyas would stay for a shorter period. But with time, the idea and burden have changed.

Over time, the hosts consider that now they do not need to maintain helping attitudes toward the Rohingyas because the overall condition of the Rohingyas is better than the hosts. "Now they (Rohingyas) are living a better life than us" (elderly host, Lambasia, Ukhiya). "Now they do not help Rohingyas because everyone knows that they are not leaving Bangladesh," stated a younger female host near KRC. According to some other hosts, "However, some better-off hosts maintain an ambivalent relationship with Rohingyas for their interest as they need poor Rohingyas for their business such as in CNG, Tomtom and daily works."

In terms of interaction, 50% of the host and 48% of the Rohingya reported meeting regularly outside the camps. At the same time, their communication over the telephone and social media (e.g., Facebook, Imo, WhatsApp etc.) is minimal. However, they usually do not meet except for business purposes. Some Rohingyas visit and get vegetables and accessories from the hosts, as informed by an older man near KRC. Some Rohingyas also come to host societies to work as a day labourer; some hosts also work inside the camps. Some hosts have lived in the areas surrounded by camps since before the camps were built in late 2017 or 2018 (for example, Camp 1E). In an FGD, some

hosts in Ukhiya expressed that Rohingyas forgot how the hosts behaved with them when they had arrived. In this regard, a local school teacher said, "Now they have become a threat to our lives and livelihoods". Some other hosts stated, "Rohingyas behave well in front of us, but they do completely different things behind of us. The reality is that we don't have a fraternised relationship with them. We just maintain a usual relationship" (Elderly man in Lambasia). A younger host in Kutupalong echoed this, "Generally, Rohingyas exercise power in camps. When they come to the host community, their behaviour is different. Many Bengali people have a good relationship with them". However, in Teknaf, some Rohingyas and hosts reside closely. Interaction between them is more normal than what is found in Ukhiya.

As explained by some Rohingyas, they received a warm welcome and all supports from the host community. They maintained a social relationship, but it has been changed over time once they got shelter in camps and aided by humanitarian organisations. "In the beginning, we used to visit hosts' houses in camps and outsides, but now we are not allowed. Even our children are not allowed to play" (1E, FGD). This statement is also evidenced by the host respondent, as more than 95% of them do not allow their children to interact

and play with the Rohingyas. Usually, they have no conflict with the hosts, but it comes to the adults when quarrels occur between children. According to some Rohingyas, "We cannot go outside of Kutupalong area for the government restriction. That is why our relationship with host community is as usual. We don't have so much opportunity for interaction" (3-4 Rohingyas discussed in an FGD, Camp 4). Some old Rohingyas living in KRC said they had a good relationship with hosts until recently, but following the 2017 influx, their mutual relationship has gradually deteriorated. Based on location and residence, the relationship differs. As we found, the host community already residing near/inside the camps' boundaries are much more aggressive against the Rohingya. On the other hand, those whose location is a bit far from camps are relatively less aggressive. In the same way, hosts in Ukhiya were found to be more aggressive or accusatory than hosts in Teknaf. The interpersonal relationship and tolerance between the host of Teknaf and the Rohingya are relatively cohesive. Since ancient times, Rohingyas' position and socio-cultural proximity in Teknaf has been a positive influence in this regard. However, over time, it has been changed toward the ambivalent relationship— realistic and purposive. Now the connection is reflected by the impact of influx and enduring conflicts.

Apart from the Rohingyas and hosts, NGOs and government officials assess the relationship between the Rohingyas and hosts. As they informed initially, the hosts thought Rohingyas would not stay more than two/three months. So, they took it positively. Also, they felt that if they sheltered them, they would be able to use their luxurious products or assets such as gold. Some hosts gave shelter on humanitarian grounds, but many got benefited too. Rohingyas arrived on different

coasts. Some of them got shelter in exchange for money and assets such as gold.

Local traders also got benefited a lot from the influx. But soon, the scenario has changed, so is the local attitude toward the Rohingya. "Now many hosts do not accept Rohingyas as their lifestyles and behaviour are different from the hosts," according to an NGO official in Ukhiya. To build social cohesion, it is essential to know each community's attitudes.

Accordingly, we looked into that. In Tables 8 and 9, we will see how the hosts feel about the Rohingyas and the vice-versa. As found in the survey, about 85% of the locals are afraid of the Rohingyas, and about 70% are angry with Rohingyas. Rohingyas, however, expressed a different attitude and told the research team that they still have a great deal of sympathy (65%), respect (80%) and love or affection (75%) for the locals.

Feelings about Rohingya	A lot	Somewhat	A little	Not at all
Fear	59.76%	13.81%	10.95%	15.48%
Anger	35.48%	18.33%	14.05%	32.14%
Respect	6.90%	18.57%	18.10%	56.43%
Love/affection	4.76%	20.71%	21.90%	52.62%
Sympathy	4.52%	20.24%	23.81%	51.43%

Table 8. Host feeling about the Rohingya

Feelings about Rohingya	A lot	Somewhat	A little	Not at all
Fear	59.76%	13.81%	10.95%	15.48%
Anger	35.48%	18.33%	14.05%	32.14%
Respect	6.90%	18.57%	18.10%	56.43%
Love/affection	4.76%	20.71%	21.90%	52.62%
Sympathy	4.52%	20.24%	23.81%	51.43%

Table 9. The Rohingya feeling about the Hosts

3.2 Religion and Ethnic identity

Religion (Islam) and ethnic identity (Rohingya and/or Bengali) are significant factors in Rohingyas' deportation from Rakhine. Some studies also found that religion (Uddin, 2021b) and ethnic ties (Uddin, 2021a) worked to get them shelter in Cox's Bazar. However, given the overwhelming impact on locals' lives, this situation is likely to change over time. Therefore, given the changed circumstances, we tried to know the attitude of Bengali, Bengali Muslim, and Bengali non-Muslim (Buddhist) and non-Bengali (Chakma) Bangladeshis on the question. In this study, we observed resentment among the Bangladeshi Muslim hosts to understand the validity of religion or ethnic ties in the current situation. During and before the influx of 2017, Bangladeshi Muslims have been helping the Rohingya from religious and humanitarian grounds. But they have become increasingly frustrated with the pressure, burden and irresistible behaviour of the Rohingyas. In addition to the direct impact on daily life, many Muslim Bangladeshis are particularly disturbed by Rohingyas' behaviour and way of life. Some Bengali Muslims said, "Rohingyas were given shelter in this country because they are also Muslims. But they do not behave like Muslims. After getting shelter, they became involved in many non-Islamic

activities—such as drug trafficking, prostitution, rape, murder, etc." The hosts living inside/near the KRC camp area are so enraged that they advise the Rohingyas to evacuate quickly. If that is not possible, "They should be killed by bombing in the camps". As stated by some others, "They [Rohingya] are so bad that they have become a threat to this country. So, they should be repatriated as soon as possible." As we found in our quantitative study, more than 50% of respondents expect that Rohingyas would be repatriated to Myanmar through diplomatic steps taken by the Bangladeshi government.

However, the non-Muslim Hindu and Buddhist Bangladeshi hosts were found not to be so critical. They also want the Rohingyas to return home. But some of them said, "Rohingyas should be provided some rights so that they do not endanger our life." Some also see the benefits of the arrival of Rohingyas in some cases. In Ukhiya, for example, a Buddhist Tomtom driver now thinks that the appearance of the Rohingya has been good for the locals in many ways, as his income from Tomtom has increased a lot.

The Chakma participants living in Teknaf (Hoykong, Lambaghona) stated no conflict with the Rohingyas. They work in the fields together. There are no separate allegations against the Rohingyas. Perhaps their location

is a bit far from the camp, so they do not think there is any conflict of interest with Rohingyas. However, some Chakmas said they live near the hills, where the Rohingyas come to work, and occasionally take fruits from the Chakmas' orchards. Apart from this, there are no other problems with them.

3.3 New—old Rohingya Relationship

The change in relationship is a matter for the Rohingya and the hosts and the old and new Rohingyas (arrived before and after 2017, respectively). One group blames the other for the existing conflicting situation with hosts. The old Rohingyas claimed that their relationship with the locals has deteriorated because of the new ones. On the other hand, according to the new Rohingyas, the old Rohingyas are now getting all kinds of help because of them, while the old ones oppress the new ones.

The level of conflict between the new and old Rohingyas is such that the old Rohingyas see new ones' arrival as a threat to their survival. They think their movement and status are at risk today because of the newcomers. We have witnessed such resentment in the KRC registered camp, where 16,714 registered Rohingyas (2712 old Rohingya families) live. Among them, 549 families do not take

any relief, especially from UNHCR or the Bangladesh government. They think that if they receive relief like newcomers, they will lose their “registered” status. They do not want to lose that identity, as they said, "If our registered

status is taken away, the government will send us back like newcomers. We do not want to go that way. We will go back if we get back other rights, including citizenship." But in observation, our team has seen some of them carrying relief

baskets/bags. Later, we came to know that those who claimed not to take relief mainly were self-reliant. Members of most of their families work abroad (mainly in the Middle East) and send remittance to them.

Table 10. Old Rohingyas’ attitude toward new Rohingyas’ shelter



CHAPTER 4

Routes to Social Cohesion

4.1 Conceptualising Social cohesion

Social cohesion is the central theme of this study. This chapter briefly discusses the concept to understand social cohesion between the Rohingyas and host communities in Ukhiya and Teknaf. Then, we focus on how to mitigate existing conflicts or tensions. In this case, the possibility of peaceful coexistence is explored. Based on the information we obtained from the field, we examined who can play the role of champions in social cohesion and how this process can be disrupted. The role of the news media in this case also demands an observation.

As a social phenomenon social cohesion is old, yet contemporary. Its necessity and prevalence have increased with the settlement of many nations and ethnic groups in modern-day societies. With the increased population movement through migration and displacement, social cohesion is being furnished to a different level as a response to conflict and prerequisite for peaceful coexistence. It is already recognised as inevitable across the continents. However, no single definition of this much-discussed phenomenon has become universal yet. Its relativity and fluidity are often considered a quasi-concept because of its varying definitions

and implementation policies due to distinct discipline, context, or issue (Green, Janmaat, & Han, 2009). Conceptually it is used to mean social relations, the cooperation and solidarity between groups and individuals living in a society and the interrelationship with broader economic, social and political outcomes (Babajanian, 2012).

Among the widely recognised definitions, we may recall great sociologist Emile Durkheim. He defined social cohesion as a characteristic of a society that shows the interdependence in between individuals of that society and coins to social cohesion: (i) the absence of latent social conflict (any conflict based on wealth, ethnicity, race, and gender, etc.) and (ii) the presence of strong social bonds (e.g., civic society, responsive democracy, and impartial law enforcement) (Durkheim, 1897). As found realistically, social cohesion is not unidirectional but interactive. Policy implications and the measurement of cohesion depend on how the concept is defined. As Beauvais and Jenson (2002) pointed out, each element could be linked or freestanding, each having different implications. They see social cohesion as one thread with a socially cohesive society. As they defined, “social cohesion or a socially cohesive society as one where all groups have a sense of “belonging, participation, inclusion,

recognition and legitimacy”.

While there is no conflict in the basic definition of social cohesion (i.e., absence of conflict), based on local dynamics, there is scope and breadth in its application across the countries. At present, the level of social cohesion varies in most countries due to diverse refugee situations. Because it is aligned with community relations, laws of the country concerned, international refugee policies, and rights and obligations. However, taking this as a humanitarian problem, the host countries maintain cohesion in the light of their own socio-cultural and politico-economic perspectives. In this study, we define social cohesion as follows: social relations and tolerance among the Rohingya and host communities because of each other's conditions (e.g., misery, deprivation, needs, rights) for peaceful coexistence, despite differences between them.

Given the situation, where the arrival of Rohingya has had a considerable negative impact, there is a need to work collectively to change the situation, turning the issues of conflict (e.g., security, works, crimes, etc.) into windows of opportunity for cohesion (see, Figure 12). As identified by the Rohingyas, the major windows for cohesion would be education, work permit and freedom of movement. To the

hosts, employment, education, health, and environments are

the major areas of concern where they want to see some

tangible development toward social cohesion.




Figure 12. Conflict scan and prospects for cohesion

4.2 Opportunities From the influx

Just as the protected refugee situation adversely affects the host community, it also creates opportunities for them to benefit. As Chambers (1986) observed, the refugee situation also has a positive effect on locals' lives—through the development of schools and health services in

the host community as a side effect of refugees' presence and the establishment of camps. Likewise, Jacobsen (2002) claimed that the economic impact of refugee flows is not always negative for the host community. The refugee influx also has the potential benefit to the hosting communities. According to him, refugees can provide economic incentives to

the host community, encouraging mutual coexistence and improving relations. Alex Garcia and Saah (2009) supported Jacobsen's (2002) scheme a few years later. They argue refugees' presence has a special relationship with the expansion of trade in the host society. As they found, new market opportunities were created for locals through

business, while camp-induced opportunities encouraged interaction and coexistence between the refugee and hosts.

As observed in the Rohingya case, several shops, transports, services, etc., have been created around the camps, various fields of employment and business have been created for the locals. Some hosts in Ukhiya said that the arrival and settlement of the Rohingyas have also made some opportunities for them. As a result of the influx, locals have got the most benefit in healthcare. The services they are getting now in different health centres could not have been “imagined” before 2017. “Before the 2017 influx, we did not get free treatment, but now we are getting good health care from NGO-run health centres.” Moreover, many educated people got jobs in some NGOs following the influx. Locals are also indirectly benefiting from Rohingya response-related activities. The Rohingyas do business setting up markets inside camps. They buy from the hosts and sell in and outside camps. Landowners can hire Rohingya workers with lower wages. Local house owners are also benefited from increased house rent.

Some Rohingyas think their arrival has contributed to the local economy as people and donors arrived in Cox’s Bazar. As they get food from aid, some sell extra or unnecessary stuff to

the relief markets, from where the locals can buy them (e.g., soap, toothpaste, brush, towels and combs at a lower price. While they do not have to spend money for food and have some cash from selling stuff and outside works, they buy transport and start business both inside camps and outsides that eventually benefit the local economy.

Some hosts also said that many got the opportunity to work in camps due to the Rohingya influx. On the other hand, Rohingyas said the aid they receive is not enough for their quality of life, so opportunities to work outside need to be increased. They think that if their children are given a chance to get an education, they will do better wherever they live in the future. If Rohingyas and hosts can share the influx-driven opportunities in a planned way, both communities will benefit and eventually support peaceful coexistence. For example, if Rohingyas teach the Burmese language, and locals teach Math and English in the learning centres in camps, such sharing will sense balance and support coexistence.

Moreover, Cox’s Bazar district has gained international prominence for providing shelter to the Rohingyas. The refugee-hosting setting, the Ukhiya-Teknaf region, is now considered a particular zone in the international arena. Some hosts also think that Cox’s Bazar has become an essential

region in the country. In their view, due to the refugee situation, many domestic and foreign aid is coming to the area. There is a lot of potential for the region’s prosperity through many development programmes in the future.

4.3 Mitigation of Tension

NGOs following the influx. Locals are also indirectly benefiting from Rohingya response-related activities. The Rohingyas do business setting up markets inside camps. They buy from the hosts and sell in and outside camps. Landowners can hire Rohingya workers with lower wages. Local house owners are also benefited from increased house rent.

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The recent terrorist activities and killings inside camps have now been identified by many as

a big threat in Ukhiya and Teknaf. As stated by some hosts (Akter, 2020), to end the conflict with Rohingyas and Rohingyas' internal conflicts (new vs. old), the government ought to take "tougher actions". They added, "If the government could dismantle the Rohingyas from the camps, they would become powerless. And they will not be able to do any kind of violence. Then, everyone will live peacefully." As most hosts think, if the Rohingya population can be reduced to a minimum number, that is, if half of the Rohingyas can be relocated from Ukhiya and Teknaf to other parts of the country, the existing conflict and tension will lessen. Although the Rohingyas feel that they do not have freedom of movement, according to some (Camp 1E, Ukhiya), they are the majority. So, there is no difficulty in their movement. The Rohingyas are satisfied with the cooperation of the CIC and the security forces in all the grievances created in camps. They said that in the past, they had to pay the host community to stay in camps, sometimes a ransom, but now with the help of the CIC and the security forces, they are much freer from such troubles. There are some terrorist groups inside the camps. The police have arrested them. As a result, they have informed that there is no such problem now. Rohingya settlement in the region has deprived the hosts of a previously healthy environment. As a result, no

safe and secured place is left for them: "Now the roads are crowded, and the environment is unhygienic". Some hosts believe that Rohingyas live in an unhealthy environment and have polluted the whole area. An NGO official in Ukhiya opined that all these issues have gradually turned the hosts into the Rohingyas' opponents. Given the situation, we tried to reveal both communities' views on resolving the prevailing conflict towards social cohesion. Both communities have offered various suggestions for overcoming the existing disputant situation.

In Table 15, we find that about 94% of host respondents do not support working outside the Rohingya camps and do not think there is a need for a separate ID card (91%). 75% do not support equal wage for Rohingyas. However, about 70% of the Rohingyas think that both communities should have equal job opportunities in the camps, while 66% of the Rohingyas think they are ready for skill training. 91% of hosts support that Rohingyas should stay inside the camps, and more than half of the host respondents agreed to repatriate Rohingyas forcibly.

The solution to the Rohingya crisis/opportunity to engage			
Way out	Agree	Disagree	Do not know
Rohingya should allow working outside the camp	5%	94.05%	0.95%
Rohingya should give a special ID card	7.14%	90.95%	1.90%
Equal wage for both communities	22.62%	75.48%	1.90%
Skills training should be provided to Rohingya	24.70%	66.90%	8.33%
Equal opportunity for both communities in camps	27.38%	69.29%	3.33%
Education should be provided to Rohingya children	49.52%	47.38%	3.10%
Send Rohingya forcefully to Myanmar	51.67%	42.8%	5.48%
Rohingya should stay inside the camp	91.90%	6.67%	1.43%

Table 11. Local views on the possible way out

On the other hand, in Table 16, we see that almost all Rohingyas (92%) want freedom of movement, and more than 80% of Rohingyas have argued for unique ID cards for this. At the same time, they want the opportunity to work inside and outside of camps (93%). Almost all Rohingyas (99%) want educational opportunities for their children. They also wish equal opportunities to work in camps (94%) and equality in

wages (91%). Considering the above issues, necessary steps must be taken to ensure social cohesion between the Rohingyas and the host community in Ukhiya and Teknaf.

Initially, the host community expressed their dissatisfaction with the Rohingyas. Still, as the discussion went a little deeper, it seemed, they also realised that peace-loving measures are

essential to ending the current conflicting situation. Likewise, in the following two tables (17 & 18), we see that most hosts (86%) do not want to form cohesion with Rohingyas.

Local perspectives		Rohingya perspectives	
Steps can be taken	%	Steps can be taken	%
Equal distribution of humanitarian aid between local poor and Rohingyas	11.67	Employment generation with participation from Rohingya and locals	61.70
Increasing awareness between Rohingyas and locals	9.52	Equal distribution of humanitarian aid between locals and Rohingyas	51.76
Employment generation with participation from Rohingya and locals	8.81	Social programmes between Rohingya and locals (games, competition, etc.)	40.99
Strict enforcement of law and order	6.90	Increasing awareness between Rohingyas and locals	39.13
Social programmes between Rohingya and locals (games, competition, etc.)	4.05	Regular dialogue between Rohingyas and local leaders	31.06
Regular dialogue between Rohingyas and local leaders	3.81	Participation of Rohingya and locals in voluntary work	28.36
Participation of Rohingya and locals in voluntary work	3.81	Strengthening of rules and regulations	20.29

*Multiple responses allowed

Table 13: Steps necessary for facilitating social cohesion

Moreover, in favour of tension mitigation, both communities considered some areas for skill development, through which impoverished Rohingyas and hosts can ensure their livelihoods. Just as the hosts spoke about the need for training

for their skill development, they also felt the need to train the Rohingyas. As found in the quantitative survey, 53% of host respondents want training in the cottage industry and handloom, 36% want computer training, and 34% are interested in animal

husbandry. Among the Rohingyas, 56% are interested in cottage industry and handloom, 22% in small business, and 18% in computer training.

Skill training sectors	%
Cottage industry and handloom	52.86
Computer education	38.33
Animal husbandry	33.81
Fixing mobile and computers	21.67
Agriculture	20.48
Other soft skills for a job	18.10
Small business	17.14
Information and Communication technology	17.14
Driving	16.67
Web and graphics designing	16.20

*Multiple responses allowed

Table 14. Hosts' interest in skill development

Skill training sectors	%
Cottage industry and handloom	56.28
Computer education	18.63
Animal husbandry	13.66
Fixing mobile and computers	16.56
Driving	15.73
None/ Do not want	15.11
Small business	21.53
Agriculture	11.18
Other soft skills for job	10.97

*Multiple responses allowed

Table 15. Rohingya's interest in skill development

4.4 Coexistence and Cohesion

In Ukhiya and Teknaf, Rohingyas reside around the host communities, usually come out of camps to local bazaars where both community members meet (mainly male members). Occasionally, they also met in the host society's mosques, but there was not much interaction between them without work. However, most of the host participants stated that they do not like exchanging with the Rohingyas. They are also aware

that their children should not mix with the Rohingyas. "Because interaction with Rohingyas will make local children worse". (Lambasia, Goyalmar). In the quantitative study, 75% of the hosts and Rohingyas had no interaction with Rohingyas, while 15% had occasional interactions. They instead emphasised, "There is no way to interact with the Rohingyas. Everything needs to be separated to avoid conflict—movement, education, work etc." Likewise, more than 90% of respondents think Rohingyas should stay inside the

camps. Everyone will be happy if arrangements are made to repatriate them as soon as possible.

Interpersonal communication is one of the major indicators of social cohesion. We already have mentioned the inter-community interaction in the preceding discussion. Interaction between the Rohingya and hosts continues, both formally and informally. Both qualitative and quantitative data provide a picture of the interaction between them (see, Tables 16 & 17).

Communication with Rohingya	Almost always	Often	Never
Meet inside camps	7.14%	8.10%	84.76%
Meet outside camps	25.48%	24.29%	50.23%
Communication over phone	1%	4.29%	94.71%
Communication over social media	0%	0.24%	99.76%
Visit hosts' house	0.71%	2.14%	97.15%
Host visit Rohingya house	1.19%	1.19%	97.62%
Rohingya attend hosts' functions	1%	1.90%	97.10%
Host attend Rohingya's functions	0.48%	1.19%	98.33%
Hosts help Rohingyas	5.24%	10.71%	93.57%
Rohingyas buy from hosts' shops	45.71%	25.95%	28.34%
Host buy from Rohingyas' shops	20.95%	14.52%	64.53%
Hosts let their children interact with Rohingyas	2.38%	2.14%	95.48%

Table 16. Interaction between Rohingya and hosts (host view)

According to the Rohingyas, they meet the hosts mostly (85%) inside camps, who go to the camps for various purposes. The Rohingyas also meet some hosts (50%) outside the camps. They also buy goods from each other's

stores (host 5%, Rohingya 47%). Visiting each other's homes/shelters also prevails between them (5%). Association between Rohingya and host children also occurs. According to the Rohingyas, 53% of hosts

do not prevent their children from associating or playing with Rohingya children. As it turns out, creating some opportunities can increase interaction between them and promote social cohesion.

Communication with Rohingya	Almost always	Often	Never
Meet inside camp	45.13%	29.40%	25.47%
Meet outside camp	23.81%	24.02%	52.17%
communication over phone	7.25%	15.53%	77.22%
Communication over social media	2.69%	4.14%	93.17%
Hosts visit hosts' house	4.97%	18.63%	76.40%
Rohingya visit Rohingya house	4.55%	19.05%	76.40%
Hosts attend hosts' function	6.63%	15.11%	78.26%
Host help Rohingya	12.84%	16.98%	70.18%
Rohingya buy from hosts' shop	48.24%	27.12%	24.64%
Host buy from Rohingyas' shop	50.10%	27.74%	22.16%
Host work in camp	50.10%	21.53%	28.37%
The host let their children interact with Rohingya	53.62%	16.56%	29.82%

Table 17. Interaction between Rohingya and hosts (Rohingya view)

On the question of coexistence, most of the host participants said they do not want to tolerate Rohingyas anymore due to the exclusive facilities and assistance for Rohingyas depriving the locals. However, they asserted, "Still coexistence is not impossible if the government gives them all the opportunities." A local school teacher said in this regard, "Majority of hosts are needy. If the aid agency can feed 10 lakh Rohingyas, why cannot they feed 5 lakh Bangladeshis? If they can look after these five lakhs, there will be no problem in social cohesion. This is so simple." It is pertinent to mention that many hosts have echoed this view. However, they did not mean the same way Rohingyas are given aid in all respects, but they also expect reasonable aid/help. Many hosts do not want the Rohingyas to leave at the moment. They want the Rohingyas to return with their rights. Until then, they want positive coexistence between them. An elderly said in this regard, "There is no peace in hurting one person." Some other hosts supported that, "We sheltered them, now we cannot force them out. To chase away means to kick them after feeding. We do not want to do that. Suppose the government and non-government organisations meet all the needs of the Rohingya. In that case, they will no longer need to go outside of camps and will not engage in anti-social activities. Then there will be no more

conflict with the locals" (Piyokpara, Ukhiya).

Some hosts also mentioned that "We should be more tolerant to the distressed Rohingyas." They also noted that if people do not tolerate others, the social environment will worsen day by day (Piyokpara). "We want them to go back. But coexistence should be peaceful as long as they are here. However, issues should be taken up politically and at the government level. Ordinary people will abide by the decision made at the highest level." (Teacher, Member, Goalmara). In addition to repatriation, provision for social cohesion should have been made from the beginning until repatriation. However, according to the hosts, including NGO officials, current programmes are neither inclusive nor sufficient for social cohesion. The hosts said they understand the government will not allow the Rohingyas to stay permanently in Bangladesh. Having other permanent alternatives, using bamboo in the camps, constructing houses, etc., suggests that the government or donor agencies are thinking of something temporary about the Rohingya, wanting them not to stay in the country permanently. "But it would be better for everyone if the money allocated for the region was spent more effectively and inclusively." (NGO officials in Ukhiya and Teknaf).

The difficulties caused to the locals' lives by the arrival of the Rohingyas are evident. Some

Rohingyas said in this regard, "Since many of us have been here for a long time, the locals are having a hard time with the rising cost of living" (Camp 4). However, they prefer interaction with the hosts because the interaction is contributory to social cohesion (Camp 1E). Remarkably, they feel the need to have opportunities for Rohingya children to interact with local children.

A Rohingya said in this regard, "We are not allowed to interact with hosts. We cannot go to the market. If we could go to local bazaars, we could interact with the hosts, talk with them. Interaction and conversation in due course would reduce distance." Some Rohingyas and hosts also felt that Rohingyas need to learn Bengali, which will make Rohingyas' treatment with hosts more pleasant and restrained. Some hosts said they are not comfortable communicating with Rohingyas because Rohingyas' language is very rough and rude. They need to learn Bangla for social cohesion (Teacher, Goalmara). "Social cohesion is possible only when the Rohingyas are educated in our language, and adequate job opportunities are created for us, and the economic balance is maintained properly."

Some Rohingyas also emphasised learning the Bengali language. "If the Bengali language was allowed to learn, we could communicate in the

same language. Then there would be no misunderstanding between us. The distance between us would have been minimised.” In contrast, some other Rohingyas opined that they do not need to learn Bengali. All they need is Burmese and English. Similarly, some Bangladeshis also think that if the Rohingyas are taught Bengali, there will be a threat of integration in the local society.

Although the Rohingyas are optimistic about the interaction between the children of Rohingyas and the host, the latter does not support it. While Rohingyas think that giving Rohingya-host children the opportunity to study or play sports together and create a working environment, social interaction will be ensured through interaction. However, most hosts think it is better to be separated than to study or work together. On the contrary, some hosts think that Rohingya children should get the opportunity to study inside the camps, and work facilities should be created for the Rohingyas. To them, “When everyone gets equal opportunity to work, it will automatically promote peaceful coexistence. But sometimes job competition creates further conflicts.”

A Bangladeshi doctor (non-Bengali ethnic (Marma) echoed much the same thing. According to him, the camps' boundaries are insufficient and

need to be enlarged for the Rohingyas. Everyone in the family cannot live in a tiny room with such a small place. He also said that along with increasing the size of the camps, it is necessary to provide a wire fence so that they cannot go outside. According to a local representative in Teknaf, there is a need to increase job opportunities inside camps, just as there are job opportunities inside prisons. If there is a chance to come and go outside the camps, there will be room for conflict and integration, which is not desirable in any way.

A piece of interesting information was found concerning the dispute between the two communities. Both the Rohingyas and the hosts claimed that Rohingyas and hosts have been working in and outside the camps for a long. There is no problem between those working, or they do not see any trouble between them. But those who usually do not work or interact tend to see many issues. Therefore, they believe that there is no opportunity for conflict if there are work opportunities and a favourable environment.

As stated by a Majhi, “The locals come to work here, we work together, and there is no problem. We also go out to work sometimes, the locals also work, and we have no problem. Those who do no work or interact

create problems and spread rumours.” Therefore, the Rohingyas believe that the misdeeds will eventually come down if we can arrange works for all. That is why if a garment or any other small factory can be set up and people from both communities have the opportunity to work there, it will be possible to ensure social cohesion along with self-reliance.

We noticed the moral differences between the old and new Rohingyas in terms of coexistence and social cohesion. The Old Rohingyas said they want to get along with the host community, but there are problems for the new Rohingyas (KRC). On the other hand, one new Rohingya said, “The old Rohingyas do not want our good relationship with the host community. They think that the government will send us to Arakan and give them citizenship in Bangladesh.” As stated by some hosts as well as Rohingyas, the differences between them are minimal. Language, religion all are almost the same. Rohingyas think that it is possible to build good relations with them if they want. Some Rohingyas said, “There is a slight difference in the dress of hosts with us. Symbolically they mentioned, Lungi will look the same when worn under the shirt. Thus, such differences can be eliminated. In the same way, according to some hosts, it is possible to maintain friendship

and social solidarity by removing all other differences. “We need a high level of (government, donor) positive signal and empathy.” In qualitative and quantitative studies, we have noticed similarities between the Rohingyas and Bangladeshi host communities in many

socio-cultural areas. Rohingyas are more in tune with the host's language, culture, or lifestyle. According to our quantitative survey (Table 23 & 24), such as the qualitative study, where 87% of hosts thought they have religious similarities with Rohingya Muslims, 99% of

Rohingyas agreed with religious similarities. 81% of hosts opined on linguistic similarity, while 89% of Rohingya thought the same. On the other hand, 80% of host respondents perceived similarities with the Rohingyas in sports, where 93% of the Rohingyas agreed.

Views on similarity with Rohingyas				
Elements of Culture	A lot	Somewhat	A little	Not at all
Religion/ rituals	56.43%	25.71%	5.95%	11.90%
Food habit	19.52%	35.95%	26.90%	17.62%
Sports	8.81%	45.71%	26.90%	18.57%
Recreation/entertainment	0.71%	20.71%	52.62%	25.95%
Language	2.14%	21.19%	47.14%	29.52%
Social ceremony/function	1.19%	27.62%	41.43%	29.76%
Clothing	1.19%	10.48%	48.33%	40.00%
Behaviour	0.71%	12.62%	40.48%	46.19%

Table 18. Hosts' views on cultural similarities with Rohingyas

The higher level of pleasant gestures among the Rohingyas is religion and ethnicity, among others. All the Rohingya respondents are Muslims, but all the host respondents are not Muslim, nor even Bengali. Among the host respondents, 90% are

Bengali Muslim, and the rest are non-Bengali and non-Muslim Bangladeshi. However, if the socio-cultural harmony between Rohingyas and hosts can be utilised positively, and supportive programmes can be undertaken for the livelihood of both, it is

possible to build and promote social cohesion in the Ukhiya-Teknaf region. A unique socio-cultural environment is absent in many refugee hosting societies worldwide in terms of refugee host relationships with historical ties.

Views on similarity with Rohingyas				
Elements of Culture	A lot	Somewhat	A little	Not at all
Religion/ rituals	79.71%	14.91%	3.93%	0.41%
Food habit	46.58%	32.92%	14.91%	3.73%
Sports	32.51%	39.13%	19.46%	2.90%
Recreation/entertainment	13.04%	34.37%	38.92%	8.28%
Language	29.81%	35.61%	23.81%	9.11%
Social ceremony/function	15.73%	37.27%	33.33%	7.66%
Clothing	9.94%	19.25%	41.82%	27.00%
Behaviour	23.40%	33.95%	30.56%	10.56%

Table 19. Rohingyas' views on cultural similarities with hosts

4.5 Champions and Spoilers

The role of the community people in establishing social cohesion between Rohingyas and hosts has been reviewed based on participants' opinions. We found mixed responses from the participants. Most hosts consider the local teachers, community leaders and UNOs as champions for social cohesion. Some of the local people's representatives are very popular, while others are unpleasant to the ordinary people. According to locals, the CIC and the security forces often stand against the host communities, which hurts the locals. Moreover, the police allow Rohingyas to go to Cox's Bazar and Chittagong even

outside the Rohingya camps. They suggested the security forces should be led by the army and be more responsible and vigilant.

The better-off hosts are seen by many as an obstacle to peaceful coexistence. Because the Rohingyas are available to them as cheap labourers. Many host participants also feel that while some NGOs conduct seemingly supportive activities for both communities, they also want the current situation to continue their actions and programmes. If the Rohingyas are repatriated or relocated, or if existing Rohingya-host tensions are mitigated, many will lose their jobs soon. In answering the question of who has the most positive role in facilitating social

cohesion among the key influential figures, respondents from both communities (77% Rohingya and 52% host) mentioned the police (60% Rohingya and 42% host) and NGOs (78% Rohingya and 37% host). Apart from the host community also mentioned the positive role of local chairman (52%), local member (47%), and local NGOs (41%).

Some local political leaders, journalists and terrorists have been identified as obstacles to social cohesion. The locals also think that non-political youth and religious leaders can serve as champions. Both Rohingya and Bangladeshis see the terrorist Rohingyas as a major obstacle to peaceful coexistence. However, we found

several people in host communities (86%) who do not expect the coexistence with Rohingyas. Instead, they want the repatriation of Rohingyas as early as possible. Because today the whole area is called Rohingya settlement to the outsiders.

On the other hand, despite some objections about Majhis

and volunteers, Rohingyas think that Majhis and volunteers understand well what they need and how to make the situation better. So, they will play a positive role as champions. They also think that religious leaders and educated Rohingyas could be included in the process. According to the Rohingyas, international organisations and the CIC

offices are doing everything for them. Therefore, the Rohingya respondents reported the critical role of religious leaders (88%), Majhi (81%), CIC (79), and local NGOs (74%) in facilitating social cohesion. However, they have thought that drug dealers, some Rohingya groups (e.g., Al Yakin, Munna group), and local leaders involved in the drug business are barriers to social cohesion..

COMMUNITY ROLE	ACTORS	REASONS
ROHINGYA		
CHAMPION	Security forces (army, police)	Security forces maintain law and order situations in favour of a peaceful living environment
	NGOs	NGOs provide the necessary support for survival.
	CIC	CIC is neutral and guardian of camps.
	Majhi	They know very well what people need.
	Volunteer	They are very close to mass people.
	Religious leaders	People believe them.
	Teachers	They are respected people.
SPOILER	Terrorist groups	They are responsible for making camps unsafe.
	Drug traffickers	They made everybody suspicious of the security forces.

Table 20. Champions and Spoilers for Social Cohesion

COMMUNITY ROLE	ACTORS	REASONS
HOST COMMUNITY		
CHAMPION	Security forces (army, police)	Security forces maintain law and order situations in favour of a peaceful living environment.
	Local NGOs	NGOs provide the necessary support for survival.
	UNO	Representative of the government.
	UP chairpersons/ members	Representatives of the local people who know what locals need.
	Educated youths	They are selfless and work voluntarily.
	Religious leaders	Locals respect and obey them.
	Teachers	They can transmit necessary information.
SPOILER	Wealthy people	They think about their interest only.
	Political men	They are powerful and corrupt.
	Drug dealers	They endangered the whole society.

Table 20. Champions and Spoilers for Social Cohesion

In general, according to both communities, the government's goodwill will play the most effective and positive role in the process of social cohesion. If the attitude

of the government is positive, everyone will be favourable toward peaceful coexistence. In addition, if the international organisations bring the host community under the purview

of their aid and related programmes, they will also play a positive role as a champion.

4.6 Role of news and social media

Since the arrival of Rohingyas in Bangladesh, especially during the influx of 2017, the news media has focused on the influx across the country. By doing so, the news media played a major role in empathizing with the Rohingyas or changing Bangladeshis' attitudes toward them. So, in the case of peaceful coexistence or social cohesion between the Rohingyas and host communities, news media also has an extraordinary impact; it can be positive or negative.

News media can play both roles in social cohesion as champions and spoilers. During the

Rohingya influx, newspapers published sympathetic news stating distressed Rohingyas' sufferings that eventually created countrywide sympathy for Rohingyas. Since 2017, local and national newspapers and social media have been covering the Rohingya camps regularly, focusing mainly on the lives of the Rohingyas. Much negative information about Rohingyas is also found in local and national newspapers that create a negative attitude against the Rohingyas across the country. In our quantitative survey, 45% of respondents favoured the news media's positive role, while 8% said that the news media is playing a negative role.

However, according to some reporters, they publish the facts. According to some hosts, newspapers do not publish all news. The news coverage mainly highlights the plights of the Rohingyas; as a result, the image of the sufferings of the locals is not reflected equally. However, they believe media has a significant role in promoting peaceful coexistence and social cohesion in Rohingya and host communities. If the media gives equal importance to the problems of the Rohingyas as well as the locals, and if the government and international organisations take appropriate steps accordingly, then it is possible to promote social cohesion.

CHAPTER 5

Operational Framework
of Social Cohesion

5.1 Overview of the Theme

One of the major objectives of this study is to design a framework that can analyse the change in conflict and the mitigation strategy. In the meantime, we have reviewed the situation caused by the Rohingya influx and examined its impact on the host society and the types

and changing patterns of Rohingya-host conflict. This chapter will focus on how it is possible to mitigate existing contentious situations and set up an operational framework toward social cohesion through peaceful coexistence and tolerance.

The research has tried to depict social cohesion in light of the current situation in Ukhiya and

Teknaf. The Rohingyas and the hosts are concerned about assessing the current situation, the changes and challenges that occur in their lives, and what steps they suggest to take toward peaceful coexistence to support their peaceful coexistence and cohesive society.

Social cohesion	Changes and challenges		Suggested initiatives
Toward a cohesive society it explores how the Rohingya and host communities perceive some basic issues that involve them both, though in different ways: work, education, health, economy, competition, security, and interaction	Changes that host community perceive as a result of refugee settlements	Challenges the host community face, affected by Rohingya settlement	Collective efforts to supports refugee-host community relationship
			What works to reduce conflict and establish peaceful coexistence.
	Changes that Rohingyas experience in the new environment	Challenges the Rohingyas witness today, in relation to host communities	What more needs to be done in the future to promote social cohesion

Table 21. Champions and Spoilers for Social Cohesion

Like other refugee situations, the settlement of the Rohingya camps in Ukhiya and Teknaf has both positive and negative impacts. Even in some cases, the same effects have been considered positively and negatively based on the hosts' livelihood and their relationship with refugees. However, the adverse effects are more prominent and familiar than the

positive ones. The host community's experience of unequal humanitarian assistance with decreased livelihood opportunities and less access to service than Rohingyas turned them increasingly inhospitable. The study findings state that improving the host experience is a significant challenge for improving the Rohingya-host

relationship. Finally, analysing the major indicators of social cohesion (components and factors), the findings show that if the host community continues to struggle with dissatisfaction to make a living less specific than before, conflicting situations between Rohingyas and hosts are likely to continue.

Gaps/problems

- Income inequality
- Poverty and indigence
- Employment
- Education
- Health
- Housing
- Interaction
- Discrimination

Institutions

- Effectiveness of humanitarian aid agency
- State institutions
- Market institutions
- Society and settlement

Belongingness

- Multiculturalism
- Trust
- Culture
- Participation
- Security
- Freedom of movement
- Social solidarity

5.2 Making a Change

Social change is the way of human interactions and relationships. It refers to a transformational genre used to promote the desired change through individual, institution, and community actions by

evaluating long-term relationships, taking appropriate planning, and ensuring the participation of concerned stakeholders. As mentioned above, social cohesion is a successful outcome of many successive initiatives. Dialogue, interaction, and building lasting

relationships are prerequisites for social cohesion, a peaceful consequence of continuous actions. This is attainable with the goal-oriented changes in different phases involving individuals, communities and institutions.

Congenial relationship and connection		Individual change		Joint community mobilisation
If Rohingyas and host community collaborating with each other	and	If they are provided with the necessary tools and skills (life changing)	then	They will play positive role in addressing potential sources of tensions

Figure 14. The sequence of social cohesion



(adapted from: Fonseca, Lukosch & Brazer, 2019)

Figure 15. A framework to characterise social cohesion

However, bringing real change is not possible at individual levels. It is almost impossible to form or promote social cohesion with a small number of Rohingya or hosts personally, or it will not be sustainable. Sustainable social cohesion requires coordination between individuals, communities, and organisations/institutes. Therefore, in the existing situation, social cohesion may be built and promoted through the interaction of individuals, organisations and communities with a balance of intervention in associated factors such as economy, accommodation, assistance, environment, rights, self-motivation, livelihood and self-reliance. This will ensure major components of social

cohesion such as trust, sympathy, tolerance, work facilities and participation. That is why the donor agency, the government, and the concerned institutions must sincerely come forward and take appropriate action. Ensuring coexistence through mutual trust, confidence, and tolerance between Rohingyas and hosts is a prerequisite for social cohesion. Moreover, work facilities and environments need to be created for both communities. Equal treatment to some basic needs such as education and health must be confirmed. And in all these activities, of course, both communities' presence and active participation are essential.

5.3 Components of Cohesion

We have identified key components (e.g., trust, coexistence, education, work facilities) to motivate the existing relationships to promote social cohesion. Cohesive relations cannot be built by focusing on some of these elements. Therefore, every intertwined component should be taken care of equally, and the programmes should be adopted comprehensively.




Figure 16. Major components of social cohesion

5.4 Dimensions of social Cohesion

Dimensions of social cohesion are imperative properties. It is crucial to know the position or status of Rohingyas and hosts in the society, based on which cohesive and realistic steps can be taken. A review of recognised dimensions for social cohesion reveals the belongingness between the Rohingyas and host communities, inclusion in the socio-economy, participation of both communities in diverse activities, their skills and social

recognition, and legal recognition. On the other hand, isolation or exclusion, rejection, non-involvement in various programs, and illegitimacy of any community are among the major obstacles. These binary dimensions need to be incorporated in the process toward social cohesion.

The preceding discussions depict three main bases in the realm of social cohesion between the Rohingyas and host communities: historical ties, existing tensions and facilitating factors. Given the

socio-historical link, we find similarities in many areas of local and Rohingya life. This orientation can also be used to promote social cohesion. If it is likely to work with these three aspects and make a working link, it would be possible to promote social cohesion between both communities. Considering the major indicators, we can imagine an operational framework (Figure 17).

In the current situation for social cohesion, resolving tensions between two communities is of

paramount importance. The existing tensions can be alleviated if the socio-historical ties (mainly religious, ethnic, and linguistic links) of the Rohingyas with the residents of Cox's Bazar can be utilised appropriately through their historical ties. This is the foremost reason why Rohingyas sought and got refuge in Bangladesh. Likewise, different elements of historical bonds act

as facilitators between them (e.g., language, religion, culture, etc.). Based on the socio-historical links, the prevalent facilitators need to be utilised through mutually beneficial programmes to ensure the proper participation of both communities. Once the existing areas of tension (e.g., aid, work, education, security) are underlined in a practical and developmental context, a

relationship of trust will form between the two communities. Once social cohesion is created and promoted, as the ripple effect, it will ensure cordial relations or peaceful coexistence and social stability, economic prosperity, work facilities, cooperation, and solidarity in the refugee-hosting region—Ukhiya and Teknaf of Cox's Bazar district, Bangladesh.




Figure 17. Local views on the possible way out

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion and Recommendations

6.1 Conclusion

Social cohesion is a successful outcome of many successive initiatives. Therefore, to achieve this, it is essential to properly understand and follow the associated steps, such as the forms of tension, the causes, and how to mitigate them appropriately. Generally, social cohesion is thought of when a post-conflict situation exists, or a refugee situation protracts in a society. The second context is relevant to the current situation in Cox's Bazar.

As the study findings suggest, most of the hosts consider the extended stay of many Rohingyas a threat to their livelihoods and the security of the region. However, it felt differently depending on the geographical location—Ukhiya and Teknaf, and the distance between camps and host societies. In general, the people of Teknaf are not as critical as the hosts in Ukhiya view toward the Rohingya settlement. In both Upazilas, the poor hosts are concerned as the wealthy or middle-class people, who either rent out their land to Rohingyas or use Rohingyas for their own business. According to some Rohingyas and hosts, several Rohingyas are being organised through various terrorist groups (e.g., ARSA, Munna group), the risks of which Bangladesh must immediately consider (Akter, 2020). However, some stakeholders (e.g., NGOs,

middle-income hosts, particularly those who have business and lands to rent) and business people want to see the exiting situation continue. They discourage relocation and do not see any possibility of repatriation.

Although issues such as equality, shared values and quality of life are often considered essential elements of social cohesion, for sustainable coexistence, this study prefers to see them in empirical reality. If they are integrated into both communities' lives, social cohesion will be formed and promoted eventually as it is not achievable merely with wishes or expectations. It requires culturally specific steps that are very close to the lives of the concerned communities. In many definitions, it focuses on the common good of both communities (refugees and hosts) as an inevitable element of social cohesion. A holistic perspective—multidimensional and flexible attitude is needed to build peaceful coexistence by increasing the mutual benefits from the situation created by the plight of refugees in long-standing refugee situations and the unavoidable impact on locals' lives.

Creating opportunities for effective interaction is the first and foremost requirement for both communities to work towards social cohesion. And it

has to be done in the light of the local society, culture, and of course, keeping in mind the legal frames and local structures prevalent in the host country. Thus, a successful project to strengthen social cohesion should be informed and implemented through a holistic approach to first consider humanitarian, developmental, and peace-building. Notably, the project should be community-based and coordinated through a flexible direction that enables it to be consistent and thrive in a specific socio-cultural context.

Once the goal is determined, inclusive programmes will reduce tensions between the Rohingyas and hosts by paying equal attention to both communities, which will build a tolerant and stable society. At the same time, both communities need to be spontaneous when connecting Rohingyas with hosts. To ensure their active participation and involvement, existing networks and social structures of the host community should be positively utilised. Accordingly, the project should include capacity building activities among the participants so that they can continue to work independently on social cohesion, be active in mutual interactions in the long run and get the inspiration and strength to continue the social cohesion within themselves without any external interventions whatsoever.

6.2 General Recommendations

Short-term

- Carefully review the impact of the Rohingya influx on the hosts (poor/wealthy) and adjacent societies.
- Past experiences should be reviewed, which has not been done in the case of Rohingyas so far.
- Since the arrival of Rohingyas has limited the employment opportunities of the locals, new work facilities have to be initiated for them.
- Vocational education and training need to be provided so that Rohingyas and locals can continue working and maintaining their livelihoods.
- The population growth of Rohingya needs to be considered by the humanitarian organisations and the Rohingya

Medium-term

- themselves.
The international community should support the host country, which provides assistance and protection to refugees and locals to find a lasting solution.
- Steps must be taken to incorporate the hosts reasonably. Otherwise, Rohingyas' stay and lives will become unsafe and unsettled, despite various efforts to assist them. It will also do ceaseless harm to the hosts.
- To create and promote social cohesion, skilled Rohingyas should be utilised appropriately.
- Fixed price/wage could contribute to reducing misunderstandings and work opportunities.
- For a peaceful coexistence or social cohesion right to education of Rohingyas

needs to be seriously considered.

Various livelihood opportunities can be created for Rohingyas, such as bicycle repairing, electrical work, sewing and handicrafts, etc., with which they can be self-reliant gradually.

- Small-scale industries and garments (e.g., soap, sugar) will also offer reasonable opportunities for both communities to work and interact.
- Tangible development projects need to be materialised in host societies such as cyclone shelters, women-friendly spaces, fire services, good hospitals, good schools, and colleges to build the host community confidence in humanitarian aid agencies.

Long-term

- The humanitarian organisations and the host country should talk to Rohingyas and hosts every few days.
- Dialogue and meetings will help resolve specific conflicts between the host and the refugee community and shape their social relations. This is especially important when refugee-related laws effectively prevent any positive interaction between the refugees and hosts.
- Mediation strategies are highly effective for long-term positive outcomes, i.e., sustainable coexistence.
- National and international organisations need to be flexible when they come to camp management.
- The views and participation of refugees and hosts in any programme must be ensured. In that case, it should be noted that taking advantage of the existing institutional strength and structure in the adoption and implementation of projects brings positive results.
- The opinion and participation of refugees and locals are inevitable in launching innovative programmes.
- Involving the host community more extensively in the production of goods for refugees will create a refugee-host community relationship and the supply of goods that will hone their interaction.
- Socio-cultural influences such as religion, culture, and language learning also contribute to a better understanding and ease momentous tensions between the two communities.
- Being the hosting Bangladesh should consider modifying or amendment of its refugee policies and laws to provide the refugee all the rights and hopes and announce Cox's Bazar as a special development zone to improve the host situation and boost their confidence.

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